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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendants agree with the jurisdictional statement in 
plaintiff's brief. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that the 
Spectrum story was privileged under Utah statutory and common 
law? 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that plaintiff 
failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence a prima 
facie showing of actual malice? 
3. In reviewing a press defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of actual malice, is it proper to 
apply a "heightened scrutiny" standard of review? 
4. May a separate claim for infliction of emotional 
distress be maintained when based on the same underlying facts as 
a claim for defamation? 
5. Did the trial court err in finding that plaintiff 
failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence a prima 
facie showing of the elements of a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress? 
6. Did the trial court err in finding that plaintiff 
failed to proffer sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment 
on the invasion of privacy claim? 
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7. Did plaintiff fail to perfect an appeal on her 
false light invasion of privacy claim? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of the district court's grant of 
summary judgment under Rule 56 is a de novo determination as to 
whether the party opposing the motion sufficiently demonstrated 
under the applicable burden of proof the existence of evidence 
establishing a prima facie case sufficient to be submitted to a 
finder of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987). A de 
novo review is necessary "so as to ensure there is no impermissi-
ble infringement upon free speech". Bose, 466 U.S. at 499. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The determinative constitutional and statutory provi-
sions are set forth in Appendix "A". These include: (a) The 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution; (b) Article I, 
Section 15 of the Utah State Constitution; (c) Section 45-2-3 of 
the Utah Code; and (d) Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Shelley Russell commenced this action following publi-
cation of a news story in The Daily Spectrum in Cedar City, Utah 
on December 11, 1985. The story reported on certain disciplinary 
action taken by the Utah State Division of Licensing after a 
lengthy investigation into the professional conduct of nurse 
Russell and Cedar City physician Dr. David Brown. Both Ms. 
Russell and Dr. Brown filed defamation suits against the State of 
Utah and The Daily Spectrum. 
The State of Utah was dismissed on the ground of 
sovereign immunity by order of the district court on May 5, 1987. 
2 
P l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o p e r f e c t an appeal of the S t a t e ' s d i s m i s s a l . 
Judge Richard Moffat , on May 1 , 1990 , g r a n t e d t h e 
remaining d e f e n d a n t s ' motion for summary judgment. A f i n a l 
judgment of d i s m i s s a l was e n t e r e d August 8 , 1990 . 
1
 In the companion case involving Dr. David Brown, the Newspaper defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment was, for the most part, granted by Third 
District Court Judge Raymond Uno. The case thereafter sett led before t r i a l , 
with the State of Utah paying plaintiff a confidential sum in settlement. The 
newspaper defendants made no contribution to the settlement. Plaintiff 
nevertheless elected to dismiss his complaint against the newspaper defendants 
with prejudice. 
2
 Plaintiff f i l ed a Notice of Appeal of the Order dismissing the State of 
Utah, but the Supreme Court summarily dismissed the appeal as not taken from a 
f inal judgment (R. 340). Plaintiff obtained a Rule 54(b) cert i f icat ion 
(R.338), but fai led to f i l e a timely notice of appeal, thus resulting in her 
subsequent appeal being dismissed. 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL PACTS 
The Relevant Parties, 
1. Plaintiff at all times relevant herein was a nurse 
employed by Valley View Medical Center in Cedar City, Utah. 
2. Defendant Thompson Newspapers, Inc. is the owner 
and publisher of the Daily Spectrum, a daily newspaper published 
and distributed in Cedar City and the surrounding area (R.002). 
3. Defendant Kristine Messerly was an 
employee/reporter for the Daily Spectrum. Ms. Messerly wrote the 
story that was published in the newspaper (R.030). 
4. Defendant Robert Bowen, at all times relevant to 
this controversy, was the Director of the Division of Registra-
tion in the Utah State Department of Business Regulation (R.003). 
Mr. Bowen was the state official designated to respond to press 
inquiries about licensing and disciplinary matters (R.203). 
The Spectrum Story. 
5. The story was published in The Daily Spectrum on 
December 11, 1985. The story contains 14 statements about 
plaintiff which plaintiff contends are defamatory. (See under-
lined portions of Appendix WCW.) The information in the story 
about plaintiff came exclusively from three sources: 
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(a) documents filed in a license revocation 
hearing instituted against plaintiff by the Utah State Division 
of Registration; 
(b) an interview with Robert Bowen, the Director 
of the Utah State Division of Registration; and 
(c) an interview with Mark Dalley, the hospital 
. . . 3 
administrator at the Valley View Medical Center. 
The State's Disciplinary Proceedings. 
6. In September of 1984, the State of Utah instituted 
proceedings against plaintiff seeking revocation of her license 
to practice nursing. The State's action followed a lengthy 
investigation of plaintiff and Cedar City physician David Brown. 
State investigators had interviewed numerous doctors, nurses and 
hospital administrators in the Cedar City area. The State 
charged plaintiff with various incidents of unlawful and unpro-
fessional conduct, including, among other things, that she 
improperly obtained controlled substances from several physicians 
and that she was impaired because of drug dependence while 
employed as a practicing nurse. A true and correct copy of the 
Petition filed by the State against plaintiff is attached as 
Appendix "Bw. 
3
 The statements attributed to Mark Dalley are not in issue in this 
appeal. 
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7. In April of 1985, a stipulated order was entered 
in the revocation action whereby, among other things, it was 
agreed that the hearing in the matter would be indefinitely 
continued, plaintiff would submit to random drug testing for a 
one-year period and a one-year suspension of her nursing license 
would be imposed if she refused the testing or tested positive 
for controlled substances. A true and correct copy of the 
Stipulation and Order is also attached as Appendix "B". 
The Conduct and State of Mind of Kristine Messerly. 
8. On December 10, 1985, an anonymous person tele-
phoned The Daily Spectrum in Cedar City and indicated that the 
State of Utah had taken unspecified disciplinary action against 
Dr. David Brown, a Cedar City physician, and a nurse. Kristine 
Messerly, a Spectrum reporter, was assigned to follow up on the 
call (R.398). 
9. Ms. Messerly telephoned the Utah Medical Associa-
tion in Salt Lake City and was referred to the Physicians Licens-
ing Board, which, in turn, referred her to the Division of 
Registration in the Utah State Department of Business Regulation. 
Ms. Messerly telephoned the Division and spoke with an unidenti-
fied woman who confirmed that disciplinary action had been taken 
against plaintiff and Dr. David Brown (R.398). Ms. Messerly was 
then referred to Robert Bowen, who was the Director of the 
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Division and the State representative designated to respond to 
press inquiries about discipline matters (R.203). 
10. Ms. Messerly subsequently telephoned Mr. Bowen 
and, in a 40-minute conversation, Mr. Bowen read, in their 
entirety, the petitions filed against Dr. Brown and plaintiff and 
the Stipulations and Orders resolving the matters. Mr. Bowen 
said the Petitions, Stipulations and Orders were public docu-
ments, but that the underlying investigative files were confiden-
tial (R.460-61). 
11. Later that same day, Ms. Messerly spoke with Mark 
Dalley, the hospital administrator at Valley View Medical Center 
in Cedar City where Dr. Brown had physician privileges and where 
plaintiff was employed, who indicated plaintiff had been fired 
from the hospital (R.399). 
12. The next day, October 11, 1985, Ms. Messerly again 
spoke by telephone to Mr. Bowen and also spoke with Mr. Robert 
Hicks, the Attorney General who represented the Division. Mr. 
Hicks confirmed to Ms. Messerly that the petitions, orders and 
stipulations were public documents and that she was legally 
entitled to review them (id.). 
13. On December 12, 1985, a story was published in The 
Daily Spectrum regarding the State's actions against plaintiff 
and Dr. Brown (see Appendix "C"). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Utah, as elsewhere, judicial resolution of defama-
tion actions against press defendants by summary judgment is 
frequent and, indeed, judicially favored. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 
556 (Utah 1988). This is particularly true where, as here, 
constitutional or statutory privileges are involved. See Oqden 
Bus Lines v. KSLf Inc., 551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976). The existence 
and application of privileges is a matter of law to be ruled upon 
by the court. Seeqmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981). 
In the instant case, each of the 14 allegedly 
defamatory statements are privileged under Utah statutory and 
common law. Eleven of the 14 statements (dealing primarily with 
plaintiff's drug use) are absolutely privileged in that the 
statements were contained in documents filed by the State with 
the Division of Licensing in connection with the state's effort 
to revoke plaintiff's nursing license. Statements from public 
documents filed in quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, 
even if false and otherwise actionable, are absolutely protected 
under Utah statutory and common law. 
Furthermore, 13 of the 14 statements are conditionally 
privileged under Utah's "fair report" privilege as codified in 
Utah Code Annotated S 45-2-3(4). This privilege insulates 
otherwise actionable statements if the statements are a generally 
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accurate summary of a public proceeding or anything said during 
the course of the proceeding. A comparison of the public docu-
ments filed in the Shelley Russell and Dr. David Brown disciplin-
ary proceedings with the Spectrum story can lead to only one 
conclusion — the story is a fair and accurate summary of said 
proceedings and thus, protected under the fair report privilege. 
The fair reports privilege is not absolute, but may be 
overcome if plaintiff demonstrates that the privilege was abused, 
i.e., that defendants made the statements with "actual malice." 
Actual malice focuses not on whether defendant acted with ill 
will or evil intent, but on whether defendant had a "subjective 
awareness" the defamatory statements were false. To overcome a 
properly supported motion for summary judgment by a defendant in 
an actual malice case, such as here, plaintiff must demonstrate 
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of the publication. In this case, 
plaintiff failed to produce any relevant evidence, let alone 
evidence sufficient to sustain her burden by clear and convincing 
evidence, that defendants entertained serious doubts about the 
truth of the 13 statements contained in the public documents. 
Plaintiff proffered no countervailing affidavits on the issue of 
actual malice, but instead elected to rely solely on two brief 
excerpts from the deposition transcripts of Robert Bowen and Kris 
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Messerly. These excerpts were from depositions not filed with 
the trial court and more importantly, did not relate in any 
fashion to the 13 statements subject to the fair report 
privilege. 
The one statement conceivably not protected under the 
fair report privilege (the "its for abortion11 quote) is nonethe-
less protected under Utah's "fair comment" privilege which 
protects false and otherwise actionable statements if they 
concern matters of public interest and are based on known facts. 
This privilege is a conditional privilege which may be overcome 
only upon a showing of actual malice, i.e., that defendants had a 
subjective awareness that the abortion quote was false. 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that 4 D&C 
procedures were performed by Dr. Brown on plaintiff during a 1% 
year period and that the State alleged the procedures were not 
medically appropriate. It is also undisputed that Robert Bowen, 
the State's official spokesman, told the Spectrum reporter that 
Dr. Brown and plaintiff were rumored to be romantically involved 
and that doctors often trade drugs for sex. Moreover, a D&C is a 
recognized procedure for effecting an abortion. To conclude that 
the D&Cs were done for that purpose in this instance was reason-
able. Even where such a conclusion is perhaps the most damaging 
of several alternative conclusions, the reporter's choice of the 
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more damaging conclusion does not satisfy the actual malice test. 
Such choices are reserved by the First Amendment to editors, not 
juries, and liability may not be imposed for errors of judgment. 
Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress was properly dismissed since the prevailing rule 
is that a separate claim of emotional distress may not be main-
tained when based on the same facts as a claim for defamation. 
To allow a separate action for infliction of emotional distress 
premised solely on allegedly defamatory words is superfluous and 
duplicative. The tort of emotional distress, where based solely 
on words, is subsumed by the tort of defamation. Were this not 
so, many of the important First Amendment protections which have 
been recognized over the years would be circumvented by a plead-
ing nicety. 
In addition, plaintiff failed to satisfy the elements 
of an emotional distress claim in Utah in that she failed to 
profer any evidence that (a) the Spectrum story was "extreme and 
outrageous" under the circumstances (b) that defendants "inten-
tionally or recklessly" attempted to cause plaintiff emotional 
distress, and (c) that plaintiff, in fact, suffered "severe" 
emotional distress, all of which is required under Utah law to 
state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
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Plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim was properly 
dismissed for her failure to proffer any evidence supporting a 
claim for unlawful disclosure of private facts, which was the 
cause of action pled in her complaint. On appeal, plaintiff 
attempts to argue a different cause of action — a false light 
claim — which was never pled below. Issues not presented to the 
trial court for decision are simply not reviewable on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE SPEC-
TRUM STORY WAS PRIVILEGED UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Under Utah law, whether a communication is privileged 
is for the court to determine. Sowell v. Freight, 519 P.2d 884 
(Utah 1974); Alford v. Utah League of Cities & Towns, 791 P.2d 
206 (Utah App. 1990). Privileged communications are of two 
classes: (1) absolute privilege, and (2) qualified or condi-
tional privilege. Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Co., 
27 P.2d 1 (1933). If absolutely privileged, the utterance or 
publication, even if false and maliciously made, is immune from 
suit. Williams, supra, at 14. Conditionally privileged communi-
cations are also protected, even if false, unless they were made 
with actual malice. The burden of establishing actual malice is 
on the plaintiff. Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 976 
(1981). 
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As demonstrated below, the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of defendants because the Spectrum 
story was privileged under both Utah common law and statutory 
enactment. 
A. Eleven of the Fourteen Alleged Defamatory State-
ments are Absolutely Privileged Under Section 
45-2-3(2) of the Utah Code. 
The majority of the statements of which plaintiff 
complains were taken directly from the Petitions, Stipulations 
and Orders filed in the disciplinary proceedings against Shelley 
Russell and Dr. David Brown before the Utah State Division of 
Licensing. The Division of Licensing is the administrative 
equivalent to a court of law and has the power to revoke or 
suspend the license of a physician or nurse to practice. Utah 
Code Ann. $ 58-1-6(4) and (8). See also, U.C.A. S 58-31-14. A 
petition is a verified document signed and filed by the Utah 
Attorney General's Office, which commences the disciplinary 
proceeding. It is the equivalent of a complaint or indictment in 
the criminal system in that it sets forth the allegations of 
wrongdoing made by the State. 
Statements made in the course of an "official proceed-
ing authorized by law" are absolutely privileged under Utah law. 
Carter v. Jackson, 351 P.2d 957 (Utah 1960). Section 45-2-3 of 
the Utah Code sets forth five types of communication which are 
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privileged, two of which are absolutely privileged. Seegmiller 
v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981). Section 45-2-3(2) 
accords an absolute privilege to any statement made "in any other 
official proceeding authorized by law." The disciplinary pro-
ceedings against nurse Russell and Dr. Brown were clearly 
"official proceeding[s] authorized by law" and the petitions, 
orders and stipulations filed in connection therewith were 
4 
clearly "statements" made in the course of the proceedings. 
As this Court has observed in Seegmiller v. KSLy Inc., 
Supra, at 77, n.8, the privilege established by subsection (2) is 
absolute and "cannot be overcome by proof of malice". 
Attached hereto as Appendix "C" is a photocopy of the 
Spectrum news story as it was published. The underlined portions 
are those statements that Ms. Russell alleges are false. The 
orange highlighted portions of the story are taken directly from 
the Petitions, Stipulations and Orders filed in the state disci-
plinary proceedings. These statements are absolutely privileged 
and therefore not actionable. Plaintiff offers no case authority 
4
 The word "statement" as used in U.CA. § 45-2-3 necessarily includes 
written statements in the form of filed documents as well as oral statements. 
See Story v. Shelter Bay Co., 15 Med. L. Rptr. 2339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) 
(oral statements and written letters to State Department of Licensing are 
absolutely privileged under common law); King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 
104 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1972) (written, verified complaint filed with State 
Division of Real Estate is absolutely privileged). 
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or argument in her appellate brief as to why the statements in 
5 question are not subject to an absolute privilege. 
B. Thirteen of the Fourteen Alleged Defamatory State-
ments are also Conditionally Privileged as a "Fair 
Report" Under Section 45-2-3(4) of the Utah Code. 
A "fair report" privilege has been recognized in 
virtually every jurisdiction in the country, including Utah. 
The privilege affords the press broad protection in publishing 
defamatory material contained in official government reports, 
proceedings and statements. Many states base the privilege on 
7 
the common law. Others have predicated the privilege on consti-
Q 
tutional considerations. Most s ta te s , l ike Utah, also have 
. . 9 
established a fair reports privi lege by s tatute . Section 
5
 The absolute privilege issue was not briefed by the parties in the Court 
below, but the matter was argued at the hearing on defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. Defendants expressly raised the issue as an affirmative 
defense in their answer to p la in t i f f ' s complaint• Defendant's fourth 
affirmative defense asserted: "The information published by defendants i s 
absolutely privileged in that said information originated from an o f f i c i a l 
state proceeding and from statements made by a state officer in the discharge 
of an o f f i c ia l duty (R. 27). 
6
 See Sanford, Libel and Privacy, Chapter 10 and cases cited therein. 
7
 See, e . g . , Turner v. Garrow, 12 Med. L. Rptr. 2315 (D.C. Tenn. 1986). 
8
 See, e . g . . Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); 
O'Donnell v. Field Enterprises, 12 Med. L. Rptr. 1927 (111. App. Ct. 1986). 
9
 See Appendix A in Sanford, supra for a compilation of state codifica-
tions of the fair report privi lege. 
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45-2-3(4) of the Utah Code provides a condit ional p r i v i l e g e for a 
statement made: 
(4) By a fa i r and true report, without mal-
i c e , of a j u d i c i a l , l e g i s l a t i v e , or other 
publ ic o f f i c i a l proceeding, or of anything 
sa id in the course thereof, or of a charge or 
complaint made by any person to a publ ic 
o f f i c i a l , upon which a warrant s h a l l have 
been issued or an arrest made. 
The code express ly provides that "malice i s not inferred from the 
communication or publ i ca t ion ." Utah Code Ann. S 45 -2 -4 . 
Although there i s l i t t l e case law s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t e r -
pret ing the f a i r report p r i v i l e g e in Utah, the language of 
S 45-2-3 has been adopted in many s t a t e s and the p r i v i l e g e has 
been j u d i c i a l l y applied elsewhere in v i r t u a l l y every s i t u a t i o n 
imaginable, including reports on physician l i c e n s e revocation 
1 0
 The only Utah case specif ical ly interpreting Section 45-2-3(4) i s 
Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc. , 626 P.2d 968 (1981). There, the court dealt with the 
third clause of subsection (4) which establishes a privilege for a report "of 
a charge or complaint made . . . to a public of f ic ia l upon which a warrant 
shall have been issued or an arrest made". 626 P.2d at 977. The Court 
declined to extend the protections of the privilege to mere allegations of 
criminal conduct made by a private person. The court held that the privilege 
i s only applicable where "official charges" based upon "a finding of probable 
cause" have been made. 
The Seegmiller opinion did not construe the f i rs t clause of subsection 
(4) which establishes a privilege for a report of a "judicial, l eg i s la t ive , or 
other public o f f i c ia l proceeding, or of anything said in the course thereof". 
It i s th is provision upon which defendants rely in asserting the "fair report" 
privi lege . 
1 1
 E.g. , California Civil Code 47(4). 
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10 1 Q 1 A 
proceedings, criminal investigations, arrest reports, pros-
15 
ecutor's affidavits of probable cause, legislative 
16 17 
proceedings, school board meetings, disciplinary proceedings 
18 19 
of a medical society, city council meetings, and various 
20 
"public" meetings outside a specific proceeding. 
Application of the privilege is not restricted to 
reporting on public documents or proceedings. The privilege also 
21 
extends to oral statements made by officials to news reporters. 
12
 Brayshaw v, Gelber, 16 Med, L. Rptr. 1692 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1989). 
13
 E.g., Porter v. Guam Publications, Inc., 643 F.2d 6159 (9th Cir. 1981); 
14
 E.g., Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 
1978). 
15
 Mark v. Seattle Times, Inc., 635 P.2d 1081 (1981) cert, denied, 457 U.S. 
1124 (1982). 
16
 E.g., Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, 8 Med. L. Rptr. 2329 
(Conn. Sup. Ct. 1982). 
17
 Stablein v. Schuster, 17 Med. L. Rptr. 1614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
18 Barrow v. Bell, 73 Mass. 301 (1856). 
19
 E.g., Fried v. Daily Review, 11 Med. L. Rptr. 2145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) 
20 See the cases cited in Sanford, supra, S 10.2.3.4. 
21
 The recent case of Molnar v. Star-Ledger, supra, is illustrative of the 
application of the privilege in situations involving oral statements of public 
officials. In Molnar, a newspaper published a story about the arrest and 
conviction of a landlord for noncompliance with the municipal property 
maintenance code. The story reported that the plaintiff's arrest came after a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Plaintiff, through a strained and inaccurate reading of 
the statutory provisions, asserts four reasons why the fair 
report statutory privilege is inapplicable. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
suspicious fire (termed a "probable arson" by officials) occurred in a 
building owned by plaintiff. The story correctly reported that plaintiff's 
arrest was unconnected with the fire, but incorrectly stated that "fire 
authorities said Molnar refused to take a lie-detector test on circumstances 
surrounding the fire". In fact, no request to take a lie-detector test had 
ever been made. 
The reporter based the bulk of his story on official documents. The 
"refusal to take a lie-detector" statement, however, was based solely on an 
oral statement made at the fire scene by a person the reporter believed to be 
a deputy fire chief. The reporter admitted that he did not attempt to contact 
any other source, including the police or the plaintiff, to verify the 
information. Moreover, after the story was published and plaintiff's attorney 
informed the reporter that the statement was incorrect, the reporter did 
contact the deputy fire chief and learn that the reported statement was 
incorrect. Nonetheless, no retraction was ever printed. 
On the newspaper's motion for summary judgment, the trial court held, as 
a matter of law, that the lie detector statement was defamatory and that the 
issue of whether the fair report privilege was applicable should go to the 
jury. An interlocutory appeal was taken. The appellate court upheld the 
finding of defamation, but ruled that the trial erred in not finding, as a 
matter of law, that the fair report privilege was applicable. In so ruling, 
the court noted that the complained of lie-detector statement "was obtained 
from a public official acting within the scope of his duties". Id. at 1826. 
The court went on to note that interaction with the news media falls within 
the scope of the fair reports privilege: 
Although the communication of information to the news 
media may not be specifically designated as a duty of 
public officials, it is increasingly recognized that 
if this communication pertains to matters which are 
within the scope of an official's responsibilities, 
such statements should be regarded as being within the 
outer perimeter of the official's line of duty. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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First, plaintiff argues that the Petition filed with 
the Division of Registration is not a "charge upon which a war-
rant was issued." Appellant's Brief at 21. This argument is 
misplaced since defendants do not rely on that portion of subsec-
tion (4), but rather, rely on the preceding clause of subsection 
(4), which creates a privilege for "anything said in the course 
of a judicial, legislative or other public official 
22 
proceeding". 
Second, plaintiff argues there was no "public proceed-
23 ing" as required by subsection (4). Id. Such a claim is 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Id. at 1926, quoting Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Also see, Bell v. 
Associated Press, 584 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1984); Cawel v. Chicago Am. Pub-
lishing Co., 274 N.E.2d 628 (111. 1971); Turnbull v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 
516 (Mo. 1970). 
22 Proceedings before the Division of Registration are quasi-judicial in 
nature and thus fall within two of the the three proceedings referenced in 
Section 45-2-3(4). See U.C.A. 58-1-6. 
23 The privilege also has been extended to "nonpublic" official proceedings 
such as grand jury proceedings. (Reeves v. ABC, 719 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(applying Section 47(4) of the California Civil Code which is identical to 
U.C.A. $ 45-2-3(4)); to a secret FBI report leaded to the press. Medico v. 
Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134 (3d. Cir.) cert, denied, 454 U.S. 386 (1981) and to 
closed proceedings of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control. Crane v. Arizona Republic, 17 Med. L. Rptr. 1353 (U.S.D.C. Calif. 
1989). 
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simply incorrect. "Public proceedings" were initiated against 
Ms. Russell before the Utah State Division of Registration in 
September of 1984 by the Utah Attorney General's Office through 
the filing of a Petition seeking to revoke plaintiff's nursing 
license. See Appendix B. The proceedings were pending until 
April of 1986, when plaintiff's one-year period of required sub-
mission to random drug testing expired Id. While plaintiff is 
correct that no "hearing" was held in the Russell disciplinary 
proceedings, there is no basis to believe the privilege applies 
only to hearings in a particular proceeding. Such an interpreta-
tion would unduly and inappropriately restrict the scope of the 
privilege. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that the 
legislature did not intend the privilege to apply to all stages 
of a "proceeding" and the decisions elsewhere interpreting iden-
tical language to subsection (4) have applied its protections to 
24 
all stages of a proceeding. 
Third, plaintiff argues that the statements of Robert 
Bowen were not made in the course of a proceeding, but were made 
"after the parties had entered into stipulations and the 
Z4
 E.g., As recently observed in Brayshaw v. Gelber, 16 Med. L. Rptr. 1692 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1989), the privilege applies to "every step" in a physician 
license revocation proceeding, including the filing of a complaint, the 
hearing , the administrative order and a press release issued by the State 
after the proceeding was concluded. 
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petitions were dropped by the Division of Registration." Appel-
lant's brief at 22. This argument fails for the reasons cited 
above in that the proceeding was still pending at the time Bowen 
25 
made his statements. The stipulation did not terminate the 
disciplinary proceeding, but merely "continued the hearing in 
this matter for an indefinite period" and provided that the Divi-
sion would "dismiss its case" against plaintiff upon completion 
of a one-year period of drug testing (See Appendix B, Russell 
stipulation). 
Finally, plaintiff argues that the Spectrum story did 
not meet the requirement of subsection (4) that the story be a 
"true and fair" report. Appellant's brief at 22. Plaintiff's 
stated reason why the story was not "fair" is because it "simply 
repeated the unproven and unsubstantiated allegations of the 
petition." jtd. Plaintiff misperceives the requirement of fair-
ness. The issue is not whether the underlying document is fair 
to the individual involved, but whether the story about the docu-
26 
ment fairly captures the essence of the document. The Spectrum 
25
 Robert Bowen made his statements to the Spectrum reporter in an 
interview in December, 1985. The Russell disciplinary proceedings were not 
concluded until April of 1986. 
26
 On pages 23 & 24 of her brief, plaintiff cites several "subtle examples 
of unfairness" in the story. These "examples," even if illustrative of the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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story, which focuses principally on the State's disciplinary 
action taken against Dr. David Brown, made it abundantly clear 
that the petitions were only allegations of wrongdoing and had 
not yet been proven. The story repeatedly used words such as 
"charges", "allegations", and "allegedly" to convey to the reader 
that the charges of wrongdoing contained in the petitions were 
just that—yet to be proven charges. Moreover, the story 
expressly stated that "no hearing into the charges was held" and 
that by agreeing to a suspension of his license, Dr. Brown was 
not admitting guilt on any of the alleged charges. Subsection 
(4) "does not require a reporter to resolve the merits of charges 
made, nor does it require presentation of the plaintiff's version 
of the facts. Crane v. Arizona Republic, 17 Med. L. Rptr. 1353 
(U.S.D.C. Calif. 1989) (interpreting California Civil Code 47(4) 
which is identical to U.C.A. $ 45-2-3(4)). 
The overwhelming majority of the Spectrum story was in 
the form of direct quotations or paraphrases from the petitions, 
stipulations and orders filed in the Russell and Brown disciplin-
ary proceedings. See orange highlighted portions of Appendix 
"C." The remainder of the allegedly defamatory statements at 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
point being made, which they are not, relate not to plaintiff but to Dr. David 
Brown and therefore are not probative on the issue of whether the statements 
made about plaintiff were a fair report of the allegations. 
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issue were quotations from Robert Bowen, the state's official 
spokesman on the Brown and Russell disciplinary matters. These 
portions of the Spectrum story are highlighted in yellow on 
Appendix "C." 
It is significant to note that the only statement in 
the lengthy story attributed to Mr. Bowen which has been chal-
lenged as being an inaccurate quote is the single 3-word quota-
tion — "its for abortion." 
In short, the story is a substantially accurate account 
of public documents and statements of a public official and is 
therefore privileged under Utah law. 
C. The One Statement Conceivably not Protected under 
the Fair Report Privilege (the "its for abortion" 
quote) is Nonetheless Privileged as "Fair Comment 
on a Matter of Public Interest." 
There is one statement attributed to Robert Bowen in 
the Spectrum story which conceivably is not protected by the fair 
report privilege, since Bowen denies making the statement. When 
asked what the four allegedly medically inappropriate D&Cs on 
Shelley Russell were for, Bowen reportedly responded by saying 
they were for abortions. This statement, even if false, comes 
within Utah's common law privilege protecting fair comments on 
matters of public interest. 
The fair comment or "public interest" privilege was 
first recognized in Utah in 1933 in Williams v. Standard Examiner 
-23-
27 Publishing Company, 27 P.2d 1 (Utah). The privilege was 
reaffirmed in 1976 in Oqden Bus Lines v. KSLy Inc., 551 P.2d 222 
28 (Utah) and again in 1981 in Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 
29 
968 ( U t a h ) . B a s i c a l l y , the p r i v i l e g e p r o t e c t s what o t h e r w i s e 
would be a c t i o n a b l e f a l s e and defamatory s t a t e m e n t s s o long as 
t h e s t a t e m e n t s r e l a t e t o a matter of "publ ic i n t e r e s t " and are 
30 
not made w i th a c t u a l m a l i c e . 
2? The Williams case involved a newspaper's editorial conments placing 
blame for the contamination of the c i ty ' s water supply, 
28 The Ogden Bus Lines case involved certain defamatory comments relating 
to a bus accident. The court determined that the public interest in a school 
safety warranted recognition of the qualified privi lege. 
^^ in Seegmiller, the court reaffirmed the v iabi l i ty of the public interest 
privi lege, but held i t inapplicable to the facts presented in the case 
involved cruelty to certain horses. The court said that absent evidence that 
the problem was widespread or that the alleged cruelty was not just a one-time 
incident, the court would not apply the privilege. 
30 In discussing the type of malice required to overcome the "public 
interest privi lege, the Seegmiller court noted as follows: 
It should be noted that with respect to Williams 
v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Co., supra, the con-
st i tutional standard of actual malice would probably 
be applicable if the case were decided today, thereby 
giving the newspaper considerably more protection than 
the rule of law which governed that case. 
Seegmiller at 979 n . l l . 
- 2 4 -
The "public interest" privilege is broad in scope, 
31 
applies in both private and public figure cases and extends to 
inferences or opinions expressed from facts established. As 
noted in the Oqden Bus Lines, supra, decision: 
. . . The right of comment is not restricted 
to a statement of the naked facts. As a gen-
eral rule, it may include the right to draw 
inferences or express opinions from facts 
established. The soundness of the inferences 
or opinions is immaterial whether they are 
right or wrong, provided they are made in 
good faith and based upon the truth. . . . 
(Emphas i s added•) 
In the instant case, Shelley Russell was a practicing 
nurse in Cedar City, Utah and had been charged by the State with 
serious misconduct regarding abuse of controlled substances, 
unethical conduct and receiving inappropriate medical procedures 
(R.449-451). It is difficult to imagine a current issue of 
greater local public interest than physician/nurse misconduct. 
The issue has a direct effect on the public safety and welfare, 
particularly in a small community such as Cedar City, where there 
are relatively few doctors and nurses. 
Bowen denies making the "its for abortion" statement, 
claiming the words were Messerly's and that Messerly asked him if 
the D&C's were for abortion and he merely responded, 
3 1
 Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Co., 27 P.2d 1 (Utah 1933) 
(public figure); Qgden Bus Lines v. KSLf Inc., 551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976) 
(private figure). 
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". . . perhaps t h a t ' s what i t i s , " t h i n k i n g she knew ( R . 4 0 8 ) . 
Ms. M e s s e r l y d e n i e s she used the word a b o r t i o n and i s emphatic 
t h a t the words were Bowen's and t h a t the quote i s a c c u r a t e . I d . 
Who a c t u a l l y used the word a b o r t i o n , however, i s i r r e l e v a n t for 
t h e purposes of invoking the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t p r i v i l e g e . Dr. 
33 Brown admits he performed four D&C procedures on Ms. R u s s e l l 
and acknowledges t h a t a D&C i s a r e c o g n i z e d procedure of e f f e c t -
34 ing an a b o r t i o n . Thus, commenting tha t the D&C's were done for 
t h e purpose of a b o r t i o n i s a comment or o p i n i o n based on t r u e 
f a c t s , i . e . , the D&C's were done and they can be used t o e f f e c t 
an a b o r t i o n . Moreover, the c o n c l u s i o n was a r e a s o n a b l e one under 
t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i . e . , the S t a t e had charged t h a t R u s s e l l i n a p -
p r o p r i a t e l y r e c e i v e d drugs from Dr. Brown and t h a t the D&Cs were 
not m e d i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e ( R . 4 3 6 ) , t h a t Bowen had t o l d M e s s e r l y 
i t was rumored Brown and R u s s e l l were r o m a n t i c a l l y i n v o l v e d 
( R . 4 6 2 ) , t h a t d o c t o r s o f t e n t rade drugs for s e x ( I d . ) , and t h a t 
3 2
 The depositions of Robert Bowen, Shelley Russell, Dr. David Bowen and 
Kristine Messerly were quoted from extensively at the hearing on defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. Defendants moved to publish the depositions in 
connection with their motion for summary judgment (R.467). The depositions 
were f i l ed in the companion case involving Dr. Brown, but were not made part 
of the record on appeal in this case, 
33 (Brown depo. Vol. 3 at 27). Ms. Russell tes t i f i ed in her deposition 
that f ive D&Cs were actually performed. Russell depo. at 47. This fact i s 
not contested by pla int i f f . 
3 4
 (Id. at 29). 
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D&C's are a recognized means of effecting abortions. The state-
35 
ment, therefore, is not actionable, even if false, under the 
public interest privilege, absent a showing of actual malice. 
As discussed below, in light of the total absence of 
any demonstrated actual malice on the part of Ms. Messerly, sum-
mary judgment was properly granted by the trial court. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO MAKE THE REQUIRED SHOWING TO OVERCOME 
THE CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGES. 
A. A Showing of Actual Malice is Necessary to Over-
come a Conditional P r iv i l ege . 
A condi t ional p r iv i l ege p ro tec t s the speaker from l i a -
b i l i t y for a fa l se and defamatory statement unless i t can be 
shown the p r iv i l ege was abused. Although there is a s p l i t in 
au thor i ty as to what cons t i t u t e s "abuse" of a condi t ional p r i v i -
lege , there i s a growing trend among the decis ions tha t a p r i v i -
lege i s abused, and therefore l o s t , only where a defendant has 
3 5
 I t i s s ignif icant to note that p la in t i f f bears the burden of proving 
f a l s i t y . Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). There 
i s nothing in the record before th i s Court (other than p l a i n t i f f ' s bare 
a l l ega t ion in her amended complaint) tha t the D&Cs were not performed for the 
purposes of abor t ion. Summary judgment was proper on th i s bas is a lone. 
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acted with actual mal ice . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true where, as 
here, an act ion involves a media defendant and the statement con-
cerns a matter of public i n t e r e s t . The burden of proving actual 
malice i s on the p l a i n t i f f , Seeqmil ler, supra, at 976, n. 5, and 
the p l a i n t i f f must prove actual malice by c lear and convincing 
ev idence . Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988). 
37 Actual malice i s a term of ar t . It i s not to be con-
38 fused with common law mal ice , i l l w i l l or e v i l i n t e n t . Actual 
J b
 E.g. , Story v. Shelter Bay Co., 15 Med. L. Rptr. 2341 (Wash. App. Ct. 
1988); Mehelas v. Arends, 12 Med. L. Rptr. 1373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Hoesl 
v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Marchesi v. 
Franchino, 387 A.2d 1129, 1131-33 (Md. 1978); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v . 
O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1970). 
3 7
 The term "actual malice" i s not, unfortunately, self-explanatory and has 
been used and defined variously throughout the years. In early Utah court 
decisions, actual malice was sometimes used to mean malice in fact, i . e . , 
malice which requires proof, as opposed to malice in law or malice which i s 
implied. E.g., Williams v. Standard Examiner Publishing Co., 27 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1933). The term has also been used to mean "spite, i l l - w i l l or hatred". 
Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (Utah 1951). In recent years, 
however, the term "actual malice" has more frequently been used as shorthand 
for the constitutional malice standard articulated in New York Times v. 
Sullivan, i . e . , "knowledge that a statement was false or reckless disregard of 
i t s truth or fa ls i ty". Seegmiller v. KSL, 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981). 
The confusion from these multiple meanings of the term has manifested 
i t s e l f in Utah's case law dealing with what type of malice i s necessary to 
overcome a conditional privi lege. Compare Combes v. Montgomery-Ward, supra. 
Direct Import Buyers Assoc, v. KSL, Inc. (Direct Import Buyers I ) , 538 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1975); Direct Import Buyers Assoc, v. KSL, Inc. (Direct Import 
Buyers I I ) , 572 P.2d 692 (Utah 1977); Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 
222 (Utah 1976); and Alford v. Utah League of Cities & Towns, 791 P.2d 206 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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malice focuses on the "state of mind" of the defendant and 
whether the defendant had a "subjective awareness" the defamatory 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
The most recent discussion by this Court on the subject appears in 
Seegmiller v. KSLf supra. There, the Court discussed both the common law 
"public interest privilege" recognized in Williams v. Standard Examiner, 
supra, and the five statutory privileges found in U.C.A. S 45-2-3. With 
respect to the former, the Court noted in a footnote as follows: 
It should be noted that with respect to Williams 
v. Standard Examiner Publishing Co., supra, the con-
stitutional standard of actual malice would probably 
be applicable if the case were decided today, thereby 
giving the newspaper considerably more protection than 
the rule of law which governed that case. 
With respect to the statutorily created privileges, the Court 
noted, "We express no opinion herein as to the effect that the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch has on the qualified privileges pro-
vided by S 45-2-3. That issue, we leave to another day." 626 P.2d at 977, 
fn. 7. In another footnote, however, the Court noted that, "It is also argu-
able that constitutional malice must be proved to overcome a qualified privi-
lege." Id^ at 978, fn, 10. Later, in Cox v. Hatch, the Court noted that 
Seegmiller was decided before Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) which "made clear" that the "constitutional require-
ment of fault" is applicable in private plaintiff defamation cases where the 
statement relates to a matter of "public concern". 761 P.2d 556 at 559 
(1988). 
The confusion in this area is illustrated by plaintiff in her 
brief. Plaintiff references three separate definitions of actual malice: (1) 
"improper motive," citing Seegmiller (App. Brief at 34); (2) "ill-will" or "no 
probable cause to believe the statement in question was true," citing Prosser 
& Keeton and (3) "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard," citing New York 
Times v. Sullivan. (Id. at 36.) Plaintiff fails to identify which definition 
governs this case, but attempts to show evidence pertaining to all three 
definitions. 
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statements were f a l s e . In New York Times v. Su l l i van , 376 U.S. 
254 (1964) , the Court defined actual malice as the publ icat ion of 
a statement "with knowledge of i t s f a l s i t y or with reck less d i s -
40 
regard of i t s truth or f a l s i t y " . 
Actual malice thus has two prongs: (1) actual knowl-
edge that a statement i s f a l s e ; or (2) reckless disregard for 
whether a statement i s f a l s e or not. 
The f i r s t prong — actual knowledge of f a l s i t y — i s 
straightforward and easy to apply. The publisher of the 
defamatory statement e i ther knows the statement i s f a l s e , but 
e l e c t s to publish anyway, or he does not . If the former i s 
proven by c lear and convincing evidence, actual malice i s e s t a b -
l i s h e d . P l a i n t i f f makes no contention that defendants had actual 
knowledge of the supposed f a l s i t y of the statements in ques t ion . 
3 8
 As the United States Supreme Court has noted, Mthe phrase 'actual 
malice' i s unfortunately confusing in that i t has nothing to do with bad 
motive or i l l wi l l ." Harte-Hanks v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. , 105 L.Ed.2d 
562, 576 n. 7 (1989). As recently noted by The Ohio Supreme Court: "A 
defendant who was motivated to publish by the blackest spir i t of hatred and 
spite wil l not be l iable i f he subjectively believed in the truth of the 
statement." Varanese v. Gall, 14 Med. L. Rev. 23636 (Ohio 1988). 
3 9
 S t . Amant v . Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) . 
40 T^e utah Supreme Court adopted the New York Times definition of actual 
malice in the case of Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981). 
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The second prong of actual malice — reck le s s disregard 
of whether a statement i s true or f a l s e — has been def ined over 
the years . In a s e r i e s of dec i s ions fol lowing New York Times v . 
S u l l i v a n , the United Sta tes Supreme Court has elaborated on what 
does and does not c o n s t i t u t e reckless disregard for the t ru th . 
Immediately a f ter New York Times, the Court described reck le s s 
d isregard as a "high degree of awareness of. . . probable f a l -
s i t y . " Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) . 
In 1968, in S t . Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1986) , 
the Court s a i d , "There must be s u f f i c i e n t evidence to permit the 
conclus ion that the defendant in fact entertained ser ious doubts 
as to the truth of h i s publ icat ion (emphasis added)." Id. at 
41 731. As i s obvious from the aforementioned c a s e s , the 
4 1
 The St. Amant Court identified certain acts which could demonstrate 
reckless disregard. These include: 
(1) intentional fabrication by a defendant of 
facts or communications; 
(2) basing an art ic le wholly upon an 
unverified anonymous telephone ca l l ; 
(3) printing allegations so inherently improb-
able that only a reckless person would put them in 
circulation; and 
(4) publication of an art ic le despite obvious 
reasons to doubt the truth and veracity of the infor-
mant upon whom the art ic le solely re l ies for accuracy. 
Id. at 732. 
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constitutionally mandated actual malice standard is extraordinar-
ily difficult to satisfy. Only where the defendant actually knew 
the statement was false or subjectively knew it was probably 
false, can the actual malice standard be met. Gross carelessness 
or irresponsibility, ill-will, intent to harm, extreme departure 
from acceptable journalistic practices, malicious, improper or 
even evil motives, are all insufficient to satisfy the 
42 
standard. 
As noted e a r l i e r , a c t u a l m a l i c e i s made even more d i f -
f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h by v i r t u e of the f a c t i t must be shown by 
43 
c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e . 
B. P l a i n t i f f F a i l e d To Make the R e q u i s i t e Showing 
t h a t Defendants made the S ta tements w i th Actua l 
M a l i c e . 
In the court below, d e f e n d a n t s , through a f f i d a v i t , dem-
o n s t r a t e d they lacked the forbidden s t a t e of mind n e c e s s a r y for a 
4Z
 Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. , 105 L.Ed. 562 
(1989) (reckless disregard not met by a showing of "highly unreasonable 
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation 
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers"); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (mere proof of failure to investigate cannot 
establish reckless disregard for truth). 
4 J
 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The Utah Supreme 
Court has also held that actual malice must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988); Seegmiller v. KSL, 626 P.2d 
968 (Utah 1981). 
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reasonable tr ier of fact to find actual malice. Once having 
done so, the burden of persuasion on the actual malice issue 
45 shifted to p la int i f f . Plainti f f proffered no countervailing 
af f idavi ts on the issue of actual malice, but instead elected to 
rely so le ly on two brief excerpts from the deposition transcripts 
of Robert Bowen and Kris Messerly, which pla int i f f attached as 
. . 46 
exhibits to her opposing memorandum. The excerpts deal 
4 4
 In an Affidavit f i led in support of defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the reporter involved, Kris Messerly, stated that the statements in 
her story attributable to Robert Bowen were accurate quotations or paraphrases 
of his statements (R. 462); that she believed the statements of Bowen to be 
truthful and considered him a rel iable source of information (R. 462); and 
that she considered the allegations against plaintiff by the State to be 
matters of public interest and concern to the residents of Cedar City (R. 
462-63). 
Even i f this Court were to conclude that Utah's conditional privi leges 
could be overcome by a mere showing of i l l - w i l l or spite , the outcome in th is 
case would not be different. Ms. Messerly, in her aff idavit , t e s t i f i ed she 
was not motivated by any i l l - w i l l , hatred or animosity toward Shelley Russell 
(R. 463). Plaintiff proffered no evidence to the contrary in response. 
4 5
 A nonmoving party "cannot rest on the allegations contained in his 
complaint in opposition to a properly supported summary judgment motion" First 
Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, rehearing 
denied, 393 U.S. 901 (1968). In order to survive a motion for summary 
judgment on an actual malice issue, a plaintiff must produce evidence of 
sufficient "caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find 
actual malice by clean and convincing evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc. , 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
4 6
 In p l a i n t i f f ' s appellate brief, there are numerous c i tat ions to the 
deposition transcript of Kristine Messerly. (See, in particular, pp. 10-14.) 
Many of these c i tat ions are either inaccurate or do not stand for the 
proposition c i ted . A more fundamental law, however, precludes this Court from 
Footnote continued on next page. 
-33-
e x c l u s i v e l y with only one of the 14 a l l e g e d l y defamatory s t a t e -
ments in the Spectrum story — the " i t s for abortion" statement. 
P l a i n t i f f proffered no evidence whatsoever, regarding the other 
13 a l l e g e d defamatory statements . Under these circumstances, the 
t r i a l court properly ruled there was no genuine malice i s sue 
(whether defined as actual malice or common law malice) to submit 
to the t r i e r of fact on these 13 statements and, therefore , held 
that summary judgment was appropriate. See Lind v. Lynch, 665 
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983); Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co. f 228 P.2d 
272 (1951) . 
With regard to the " i t ' s for abortion" quote, the con-
c lus ion that the four D&C's performed on p l a i n t i f f were for abor-
t i o n s (regardless of who expressed that conclusion — Bowen or 
Messerly) i s a reasonable one under the circumstances known to 
both Messerly and Bowen at the time, i . e . , that the State 
be l i eved the D&Cs were "not medically indicated" (R.436) , that 
Dr. Brown and p l a i n t i f f were rumored to have had a romantic r e l a -
t i o n s h i p (R.462); that p l a i n t i f f inappropriately received drugs 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
considering this information. The Messerly deposition was not filed in the 
Russell case and was, therefore, not considered by the trial court, except to 
the extent excerpts were provided as attachments to the parties' legal 
memoranda. Depositions not considered below may not be considered on appeal. 
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, 380 
P.2d 135 (Utah 1963); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah App. 1989). 
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from Dr. Brown; that it was not uncommon for doctors to trade 
drugs for sex (id.); and that D&Cs are a recognized means of 
effecting an abortion. 
The drawing of an erroneous conclusion, or even the 
worst of several possible conclusions, simply does not demon-
strate a subjective awareness of probable falsity. Time v. Pape, 
401 U.S. 279 (1971). Pape involved a story by Time Magazine on 
the report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights. The 
story erroneously reported that the Commission had made findings 
regarding certain incidents of brutality by the Chicago police. 
In fact, the report had merely referenced certain allegations of 
police brutality that had been made in a lawsuit. The Court 
found that although the author of the Time story knew the 
incident was included in the Commission's report only as 
allegations and not as fact, the omission of the words "alleged" 
did not constitute actual malice since the conclusion that the 
Commission made findings represented "one of a number of possible 
rational interpretations" of the report. 401 U.S. at 283. 
Plaintiff simply failed to proffer sufficient evidence 
upon which a reasonable jury could conclude by clear and 
convincing evidence that defendants subjectively entertained 
serious doubts about the truth of the "it's for abortion" 
statement. 
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THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAIN 
TIFF'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
^. .cr
 4 o . tah has followed ^ v e Restatement r ^crzs 
•'.•r* *nat p l a ' n ^ r f r ecover * -r * * eit;'vria, iniiiciiun 
i : j _ v nr reck-
lessly cause severe emotional distress by engaging in extreme and 
out rageous conduct. Restatement (Second) Tor t s * 4 b ^njms _ v^ 
Eccles, i1 1! Il" ,.'"«1 )4>I (111 jh ' 9 b J ) . U 
To support a cause of action tor intentional infliction 
of emot ional distress, pla i n t \ f f m s • s how t llhu* i1 i | 11 w i ng 
elements: 
1. extreme and outrageous conduct by 
de f endan t s ; 
2 . defendants 1 i n t e n t to cause emo-
t i o n a l d i s t r e s s ; 
3 . s eve re emotional d i s t r e s s ; and 
4 . an a c t u a l and proximate causa l l i n k 
between the t o r t u o u s conduct and the emo-
t i o n a l d i s t r e s s . 
White v , Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah App. 1990) . 
4 /
 Since i t s decision in Sanros v. Eccles, the Utah Supreme Court has 
repeatedly cited with approval the Samms case. The most recent reaffirmation 
was in the 1989 decision of Larson v. Sysco Corp.y 767 P.2d 557 (Utah). 
As t h i s Court has r e c o g n i z e d , a c l a i m for e m o t i o n a l 
48 d i s t r e s s i s e a s y t o a s s e r t and may be e a s i l y f a b r i c a t e d . As a 
c o n s e q u e n c e , Utah c o u r t s have shown no r e l u c t a n c e in d i s m i s s i n g 
49 
e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s c l a i m s on mot ion . 
As d i s c u s s e d be low, the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of 
p l a i n t i f f ' s emot iona l d i s t r e s s c l a i m was a p p r o p r i a t e for any one 
of four s e p a r a t e r e a s o n s . 
*8 The dangers inherent in allegations of intentional in f l i c t ion of 
emotional d is tress were described in Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (Utah 
1961) as follows: 
[due to the highly subjective and vo la t i l e nature of 
emotional distress and the variabil i ty of i t s causa-
tions, the courts have historical ly been wary of dan-
gers in opening the door to recovery therefor. This 
i s partly because such claims may easi ly be fabri-
cated; or as sometimes stated, are easy to assert and 
hard to defend against. 
4 9
 E.g. , Larson v. Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989) (granting summary 
judgment in an employment termination case); Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 
P.2d 1025 (Utah 1987) (granting employers motion for summary judgment despite 
fact employer had given employee a false reason for termination); White v. 
Blackbury, 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah App. 1990) (granting summary judgment in the 
context of a claim for interference with parent-child relationship); Amica 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989) (summary judgment 
granted in insurance fraud case); Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 
838 (Utah App. 1989) (summary judgment granted to insurance company in bad 
faith denial of insurance claim case)• 
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A. A Separate Claim for Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress May Not Be Maintained When Based on the Same 
Facts as a Claim for Defamation. 
tress ^ Lginated ^ ^ w e compensation r - ,1/ -rageous . v a -
ries that 1 \ - - readily fall w rh * *»e "cur * ^ ao-
MacDonald v . me^ , .^vz, *;pt-*-. 
. v*d. ' \- *^> 'ons v ^.d ilthougn e -invair^: of 
a defamati - • ; ^  • ..>*. ^Liui 
cumstances wher^ plaintiff states ,. a * n, r^ def amat - ;, ,. n 
emotiona^ ; stress ma> 
.i^ eo ' **s Hpan w.^tri- -joumzeu *i ! allegedly defamatory 
words do - independent •-*• cause f K t i o n 
s u c h «is ; w o r k m v Hustler 
M a g a z i n e , Inc. , J< ij , teb ui w. .r , <i - j Basilius v. Hono-
lulu Publishing Co. , ": ip:• ^ i^  f M v ] 989); Ford v . 
Rovlai idr 990 ) ; Smith v. 
Dameron, *>.•-. < * . n * . .98 7); Wilson v. 
Merrill Lynch, 489 N.E. «.** 1297, attaining 111 A.D. 2d 8007 
I fJ V "I. ii* I TIS) . 
li recent years, the issue has arisen most often in the 
context of determinii 
tions to an*^ * defamation claim and emotional distress 
i P .. 
claim are pled and both arise out of the same facts. Most states 
have relatively short limitations periods for defamation as com-
pared to other torts. In such a context, the courts have univer-
sally held that a claim for emotional distress is barred if out-
side the limitations period for defamation. 
To allow a separate action for infliction of emotional 
distress premised solely on allegedly defamatory words is super-
fluous and duplicative. The tort of emotional distress, where 
predicated solely on defamatory statements, is simply subsumed by 
the tort of defamation. Were this not so, many of the First 
Amendment protections which have been recognized over the years 
would be circumvented by a pleading nicety. 
For example, the constitutionally mandated requirement 
that certain defamation plaintiffs cannot recover absent proof of 
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence has been extended 
to claims for emotional distress stemming from allegedly 
defamatory words. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988). 
This Court should join the growing number of states to 
hold that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
50
 Lusby v. Cincinnati Monthly, 17 Med. L. Rptr. 1962 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(applying Ohio law); Lash lee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying 
Ky law); Smith v. Esquire, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 967 (D. Md. 1980); Eastwood v. 
Cascade Broadcasting Co., 722 P.2d 1295 (Wash. 1986); Magenis v. Fisher 
Broadcasting, 18 Med. L. Rptr. 1229 (Ore. Ct. App. 1990). 
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d i s t r e s s c a i 11 1 :: t Sb e s e p a i a t • 51 } " m a I n t a i i \ e d * h e n based o i i t h e same 
facts as a rlaim tor defamation. 
B. Publication ot trie Spectrum blory Was Nut "Kxlieme 
and Outrageous. 
Whether the allpqpd r. Huhm i m.iy i H isuntil" 1"» in ne^anled 
as suttlciently extreme and outrageous i.-» for the :oi*r! " .* 
initially determine. Restatement I Second) Torts % 4b; Gyqi v. 
Storch, S«! ?, P ,M •!, J" ! J. !M ' ) . 
Ohiy the most reprehensible conduct which fdi* exceeds 
the permissible societal r> • * • decenrv ~ v suppor =ausr uf 
iii" i in iiiii ""in 1! HI 11 i in ., * . . j :s . ess>. Comment 
(d) ox m e Restatement xplains .<-
 :i t* : conduct that is 
required: 
Liability has been found only where the con-
duct has been so outrageous in character, and 
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious, and utterly i ntol era-
ble in a civilized community. 
An", iqh t ht"'" re "I iii ni rim i i i " S|M*I " y dea * h 
defamatory s t a t e m e n t s it • I hi b a s i s turn - s e p a r a t e _ . J - r o r 
51 
i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n o l e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s , t h e i s^uc has 
51 The closest case to a situation where utterances were the basis of a 
claim for emotional distress i s Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025 
(Utah 1987). Sperber involved an anployee who was terminated by defendant 
"because of lack of work", a reason plaintiff contended was fa lse , 747 P.2d a t 
1026. P la in t i f f sued the employer on a variety of grounds, including wrongful 
Footnote continued on next page, 
ID 
a r i s e n r e c e n t l y in o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . In the l a s t f i v e y e a r s , 
13 j u r i s d i c t i o n s have ru l ed on the i s s u e of whether an a l l e g e d 
defamatory s t a t e m e n t c o n s t i t u t e d extreme or o u t r a g e o u s c o n d u c t . 
In a l l but one d e c i s i o n , the c la im for i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n of 
e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s was d i s m i s s e d as not s a t i s f y i n g the "extreme 
52 
or o u t r a g e o u s " s t a n d a r d . 
The c a s e of Brooks v . P a i g e , 12 Med. L. Rptr . 2353 
( C o l o . D.C. 1986) i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of the j u d i c i a l r e l u c t a n c e t o 
i n t e r p r e t defamatory s t a t e m e n t s as extreme and o u t r a g e o u s c o n -
d u c t . In Brooks , the defendant was a g u e s t on a TV s p o r t s t a l k 
show. During t h e show, he took a l i f e s i z e photograph of p l a i n -
t i f f , drew a moustache and beard on i t , s p i t r e p e a t e d l y on i t , 
jumped up and down on i t , k icked i t o f f the s t a g e and made 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
discharge and intentional inf l i c t ion of emotional d i s tress . The Court granted 
defendant's motion for summary judgment holding that "mere discharge from 
employment does not constitute outrageous or intolerable conduct", even where 
an employee i s given "a false reason for his dismissal." W. at 1028. There 
was no adjudication as to whether the reason was false and, in any event, the 
words were not defamatory. 
5 2
 Arizona, Ruttledge v. Phoenix Newspapers, 12 Med. L. Rptr. 1969 (1986); 
California, Coch v. Goldway, 11 Med. L. Rptr. 1362 (1984); Colorado, Brooks v. 
Paige, 12 Med. L. Rptr. 2353 (1986); Kansas, Hanrahan v. Home, 9 Med. L. 
Rptr. 1216 (1983); Massachusetts, Morrell v. Forbes, 11 Med. L. Rptr. 1869 
(1985); Michigan, Andren v. Knight Rider, 10 Med. L. Rptr. 2109 (1984); 
Minnesota, Price v. Viking Press, 12 Med. L. Rptr. 1689 (1985); New York, Jong 
v. Fast, 10 Med. L. Rptr. 2461 (1984); Ohio, Angelotta v. ABC, 12 Med. L. 
Rptr. 1491 (1985); Oregon, Ault v. Hustler, 13 Med. L. Rptr. 1657 (1986); 
Pennsylvania, Reichenbach v. Call-Chronicle, 9 Med. L. Rptr. 1438 (1982). 
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•u.'v" i i 1 J 1 1 "'•,<jtf«'i I ', "J(J ( amatory st atements about plaintiff In 
granting the defendant's motiun for directed verdict, the court 
concluded that defendan! • irt IUIII1, \\u\ iHtemnnts ilMmuqh 
:: ^ffei isive and discourteous, did nut meet the test at "extreme and 
53 
outrageous conduct."* 
- - - . h 
pleadi nq *- < jDi.caziou *.• Spectrum •.-, was 
< '*e'ne J: rageous" under the r ^cumstances. s - en if 
c f - oion to 
publish •' extreme ana outrageous <,:*.• - 4 >. st^r* %a<- based on 
public documents and on statements oi puuii * " . 
5
*> The case of Jong v. Fast, 10 Med,, L, Rpti 2 46 N.V.L-.L. 1984 J IS also 
helpful in the particular factual context of the instant case. In Jong, 
plaintiff was a best selling book author• She alleged her former husband 
committed intentional infliction of emotional distress by tortuously interfer-
ing with her contractual relations with her publisher by writing a letter to 
the publisher which contained various defamatory statements. She also alleged 
her husband commenced frivolous legal actions against her and threatened and 
harassed her. In granting defendant's motion for dismissal, the court held 
that "the alleged conduct set forth in plaintiff's complaint, no matter how 
reprehensible, did not "exceed all bounds normally tolerated by decent 
society." JdL at 2462, 
54
 Plaintiff points 1 : : defendants1 publication of "tl le information 
contained in the Petition" (App. brief at 42) and the "its for abortion" quote 
as evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct. As noted previously, the 
petition was a public document filed in connection with an official state 
disciplinary proceeding. Use of such public information in connection with a 
news story of significant local community interest hardly rises to the level 
of extreme and outrageous conduct. Even the use of the abortion quote does 
not rise to the type of conduct that "goes beyond all possible bounds of 
decency" given, the circumstances existing r*+ *"ne ti me, I e Br °-~v~
 in 
Footnote continued on next page. 
C. The Newspaper Defendants Did Not "Intent iona l ly or 
Recklessly" Attempt to Cause P l a i n t i f f Emotional 
D i s t r e s s . 
As s t a t e d in the a f f i d a v i t of Christ ine Messerly f i l e d 
in the court below, Ms. Messerly did not i n t e n t i o n a l l y seek to 
cause She l l ey Russel l emotional d i s t r e s s (R.463) . In f a c t , she 
had no i l l w i l l toward Ms. Russel l and intended her no harm 
whatsoever ( J d . ) . The newspaper was reporting on a matter of 
great publ ic concern to i t s readers and the s tory was based upon 
matters of publ ic record and from an interview with the s t a t e 
o f f i c i a l whose department brought the o r i g i n a l charges against 
She l l ey Russe l l and whose l ega l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was the regulat ion 
of nurses . None of the newspaper defendants involved had any 
pr ior dea l ings or r e l a t i o n s h i p with the p l a i n t i f f . 
The record in the t r i a l court was abso lute ly devoid of 
any evidence which could support even an inference that the 
defendants i n t e n t i o n a l l y or r e c k l e s s l y attempted to cause She l l ey 
Russe l l emotional d i s t r e s s . 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
fact, performed 4 D & C's on plaintiff, D & Cs are a recognized procedure to 
effect an abortion and the state did seek revocation of Dr. Brown's license 
for, among other things, performing inappropriate medical procedures on 
plaintiff. It also deserves mentioning that not all abortions are i l legal in 
Utah, particularly under the laws existing in 1985. To state that a woman had 
an abortion, under these circumstances, simply does not legally constitute 
extreme and outrageous conduct. 
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D. Plaintiff Failed to Proffer Any evidence That She 
Suffered "Severe" Emotional Distress. 
The record before the trial court was barr^r ~* -*~v 
evidence either by affidavit , cited deposition testimony or 
otherwise, hhat p, laiiit Ml si f fe *ed in" ein " IM'MI I1 I s r i esi.; IM! 
alone "severe™ distress as required uiidei runt rolling Utah rase 
law, A conclusionary allegation in a romplaint that plaintiff 
s'"f ' e r ed eme: • i««, j,na ! -i' i*» f v ius « > •- i IM^ I y •«»»; "if I > ,; i ei , I i j /ercome a 
motion tor summary sudgment. Arnica Mutual Insurance C o . , 768 
P.2d 950 Utah App. 1*89). 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED IHE INVA-
SION OF PRIVACY CLAIM PLED IN PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED COMPLAINT SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO 
PROFFER EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO AVOID SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Plaint it f ;vas5'j{ «,:
 r.ii'~.i<*y aim - »*.- -mended 
Cc * w 
aw a „<j^:b. .- h . o JIA.L^.^ , inescapab le icr r r_y 
because abandonmei appeal • - n°< ~>: ^ u t 
a 1 •
 f f - her 
"newl rgued" f a l s e l i g h t :am lee T .nq a t t e n t i o n 
devoted ~v w.*>. .*w* ^v*^^^ x ^ i i i ciaim ^u appeal p a r a n e e 
55
 Plaintiff devotes but one page in her brief to a substantive discussion 
of the alleged false light claim and cites not a single case in support of her 
new theory, 
treatment (or lack thereof) given the old claim in the court 
below. In her memorandum in opposi t ion to defendants' motion 
for summary judgment, p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d to c i t e a s i n g l e case in 
support of her claim that the Spectrum story invaded her privacy 
(R.506-509) . No a f f i d a v i t s addressing t h i s i s sue were f i l e d , and 
the record before the t r i a l court was devoid of any evidence sup-
port ing an unlawful d i s c lo sure of pr ivate f a c t s c laim. This was 
in stark contrast to the ample case authority and d i s c u s s i o n s e t 
57 forth by defendants in the i r supporting memorandum. Faced with 
b b
 In fact , the argument on appeal set forth on pp. 37-40 of Appellant's 
brief i s a verbatim restatement of pp. 29-32 of p l a i n t i f f ' s memorandum f i l ed 
with the Court below in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment 
(R. 506-509). 
b /
 As noted in defendants' memorandum supporting their motion for summary 
judgment, p l a i n t i f f ' s cause of action for disclosure of private facts f a i l s 
for four reasons. First , p la in t i f f ' s Complaint does not specify what 
published facts were allegedly private and offensive. There was considerable 
information published about plaint i f f , most of which was not "private" and the 
remainder of which was not "offensive." A claim for re l ief on the basis of 
publication of private facts must contain a statement of what the private 
facts are. See Flowers v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings A s s o c , 
679 P.2d 185 (Or. App.), review denied, 687 P.2d 795 (Or. 1984); Underwood v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, 198 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Cal. App. 1984). 
Second, the information published about plaint i f f was not private 
because the information was already a natter of public record in that the 
information was contained in the petit ion, stipulation and order f i led in 
connection with the State's Disciplinary Proceeding against Ms. Russell. See 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). Perhaps the most 
"private" fact disclosed in the story was the reference to the four D&Cs 
performed on p la int i f f . This information was part of the public record, 
having been expl ic i t ly set forth in the State's petit ion against p la int i f f . 
Footnote continued on next page. 
- 4 5 -
the above situation, "> was proper and appropria* -» f\ i he "rial 
cour1" - dismiss r M ; " 1 : ? * ' "laiTi t nee 'he issue 01 *'*-
all .1 . . .i. !v,-5 i ^ t or^'acv Mv<» 
stated is i quests * * ne '.• - isanre Cox v. Hatch, 
761 p # 2d 556 ».'Jtan 1988). 
Ft w il n o t P i "Oi 11 i i m i n i I i I.TJI u i c u 111 
Finally, the information published about piaintiff was newsworthy. The 
burden of proving that the information was not newsworthy is part of the 
plaintiff's case in chief. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal , Rptr 782 
(Cal. App. 1983). The requirement that Ms. Russell demonstrate that the 
published information was not newsworthy is also required by the First 
Amendment. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S.Ct. 2603, 2609 (1989) <"[l]f a 
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public 
significance then State officials may not constitutionally punish publication 
of the information, absence a need to further a State interest of the highest 
order," quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.y 99 S.Ct. 2667f 2671 
(1979). This constitutional requirement provides "the breathing space needed 
by the press to properly exercise effective editorial judgment." Gilbert v. 
Medical Economics Co., 665 P.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981). In this instance, 
the subjects of substance abuse by nurses and the performing of unnecessary or 
improper medical procedures (all of which were alleged to have occurred by the 
State) are clearly topics of great public interest, particularly in a small 
community like Cedar City which has only one hospital and few physicians and 
nurses 
In sum, plaintiff has failed to adequately plead or adduce any evidence 
to satisfy the recognized elements of stating a sufficient cause of action for 
invasion of privacy through the publication of private and offensive facts 
The issue of whether all elements of a claim for invasion of privacy have been 
stated is a question of law in the first instance and thus ripe for determina-
tion, on motion. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P 2d 556 (Utah 1988), 
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PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROPERLY PERFECT AN 
APPEAL ON HER PURPORTED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
INVASION OF PRIVACY. 
The Seventh Cause of Action in plaintiff's amended Com-
plaint attempts to assert an invasion of privacy claim for "pub-
lic disclosure of private facts" (R.262). This claim is one of 
four separate and distinct torts recognized under the broad cate-
gory of invasion of privacy. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 
C Q 
1988) . The other three t o r t s are (1) intrus ion (2) f a l s e l i g h t 
and (3) misappropriation of name or l i k e n e s s . Id., c i t i n g 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 652A (1977) . Each category i s a 
separate t o r t and i s based on d i f f e r e n t e lements . The cause of 
ac t ion which was the subject of defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, and which was briefed and argued to the t r i a l court 
(R.423-426) and which was subsequently dismissed by the t r i a l 
court (R.590-91) was for "the tor t of d i s c l o s u r e of pr iva te 
f a c t s . " 
On appeal, however, p l a i n t i f f mysteriously j e t t i s o n s 
the pleaded cause of act ion and, instead, argues an e n t i r e l y new 
and separate cause of act ion — "false l ight" - a cause of ac t ion 
5 8
 "The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four 
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common 
name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents 
an interference with right of the plaintiff. • . 'to be left alone'.H 
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1968). 
- 4 7 -
which wiv never pled argued below. Fcr eiainule P'aui-
n t f -i <« ;ssues for Appeal, she characterizes her 
claim as a taise liyh1 claim (Appellant's brief a! 1 \ p, h1 and 
un paqe 33 of her b n e i ship si a! ->s "|.il iiint ill" u LU lying upon I "it" 
i ',"« jt | l»)i city that ! mreasonably places the other m a false 
light before • «= . Plaint*:: • ~<- proceeds to arque in 
her briet \- single > false liqht 
claim, is ma-it by mere is^:losure ~f "something that, would be 
objectionable - rdinary reasonable person". Notwithstand™ 
i i q i iiini1 i in i i i ill i in in • i ill i i h i t i 11fill 1 P s t a t e m e n t o f t h e 1«iw 
there is "dry one von 1 plaintiff's brief dealing wi fh the 
actual cause of action pled and considered lo ' \ he i i i . i l l u i j ' t . 
tJI l.j 1 1 ' n I ' '"i»|jiiy ' " < "i M *jue a new cause ot action un appeal 
that was never pled or raised below, and tor this reason alone 
the 'rial • ur t" s d i smissa 1 «• f j»! , 11 n t i f f * s i nv, i \ i 
i J dim should be sustained. 
59 
60
 Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984) (issues not presented 
to the trial court for decision are not reviewable on appeal). See also, 
Mascaro v. Davisf 741 P.2d 938 (! ftah ] <»m 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this lOfU day of April, 1991. 
3>. 
RANDY y. t)RYER 
of andfor 
PARSONS/BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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Tab A 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STAi'FS 
AMENDBONTS I-X [BELL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDlflSNTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious ancft political freedom.) 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMEIV 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT HI 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law: nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
MENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and. cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witaa«»0* *f»t»»f* him; to haw coos* 
puisory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VU 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT EX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
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(a) persona charged with a capital offense 
whan t h a n ia substantial evidence to support tha 
charge; or 
(b) personj charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
subetaaaiai evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by 
statute, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the charge and the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person would 
constitute a substantial danger to self or any 
other person or to the community or is likely to 
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on 
bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law. i960 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.) 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. isse 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.) 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. isse 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The for* 
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
IMS 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. isss 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 
1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder —- Ex post facto l a w s — Im-
pairing contracts . ] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the 3ame overt act. 1896 
Sec . 20. [Military subordinate to the civil 
power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State. 1W6 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. isss 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
franchise, privilege or immunity. 18SS 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule S6 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brifham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Aafurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B. Y.U. L. Ryv. 937.
 tlM o r f l h o f n e c e 8 8 a r y p a p e r 8 t 2 1 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
 1255 
§ § c ! i l - 49 C J A Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 f
 F
*
i l u ? to * v e
 k
n o t l c e
 °f • P P ^ t i o n for de-
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to iia- [a u i t J«ta™«t where notice is required only 
biiity against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d °y custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers- — Judgment •» 92 to 134 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
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45-2-2 NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO BROADCASTING 644 
or slander, within three days after learning of the 
mis take or within th ree days after service upon the 
person broadcast ing t h a t libel or slander, by the 
party aggrieved, of a wri t ten notice specifying the 
s ta tement alleged to be erroneous or, in case such 
notice is not served, in the manne r and within the 
time above specified after the filing of the complaint 
and service of the summons in said action, then the 
plaintiff shall recover only actual damages 
(2) This section shall not apply in the case of any 
libel or slander against any candidate for a public 
office at any general or pr imary election, or any 
avowed candidate for nomination to any office before 
any political convention, unless the retraction of the 
charge was made in the same manner as provided for 
other retractions under this section within 24 hours 
of the t ime the person broadcasting tha t libel or slan-
der became aware of the mistake, but in no case later 
than three days before the holding of such general or 
pr imary election or political convention. A wri t ten 
text of the retraction shall be made available to the 
candidate immediately after it has been broadcast. 
This retract ion shall be m lieu of any other retraction 
herein provided for 1975 
45-2-2. Libel and slander defined. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Libel" means a malicious defamation, ex-
pressed either by printing or by signs or pictures 
or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one 
who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, 
virtue or reputation, or publish the natural de-
fects of one who is alive, and thereby to expose 
him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule 
12) 'Slander71 means any libel communicated 
by spoken words, 1975 
45-2-3. Privileged publication or broadcast de-
fined. 
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall 
not be considered as libelous or slanderous per se, is 
one made 
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty 
(2) In any publication or broadcast of or any 
statement made in any legislative or judicial pro-
ceeding, or in any other official proceeding autho-
rized by law 
(3) In a communication, without malice, to a 
person interested therein, by one who is also in-
terested, or by one who stands in such relation to 
the person interested as to afford a reasonable 
ground for supposing the motive for the commu-
nication innocent, or who is requested by the per-
son interested to give the information 
(4) By a fair and true report, without malice, 
of a judicial, legislative, or other public official 
proceeding, or of anything said in the course 
thereof, or of a charge or complaint made by any 
person to a public official, upon which a warrant 
shall have been issued or an arrest made. 
(5) By a fair and t rue report , wi thout malice, 
of the proceedings of a public meet ing, if such 
meet ing was lawfully convened for a lawful pur-
pose and open to the public, or the publication or 
broadcast of the m a t t e r complained of was for the 
public benefit. 1975 
45-2-4. Malice not inferred from publication. 
In the cases provided for in Subsections (3), (4) and 
(5) of the preceding section, malice is not inferred 
from the communication or publication. isos 
45-2-5. Radio or television broadcasting statkm 
or .network of stations. 
No person, firm, or corporation owning or operating 
a radio or television broadcasting station or network 
of stations shall be liable under the laws of libel, slan-
der or defamation on account of having made its 
broadcasting facilities or network available to any 
person, whether a candidate for public office or any 
other person, or on account of having originated or 
broadcast a program for discussion of controversial or 
any other subjects, in the absence »( proof of actual 
malice on the part of such owner or operator. In no 
event, however, shall any such owner or operator be 
held liable for any damages for any defamatory state-
ment uttered over the facilities of such station or net-
work by or on behalf of any candidate for public of-
fice 1963 
45-2-6. Right of station to require submission of 
matter intended to be broadcast. 
Any person, firm, or corporation owning or operat-
ing a radio or television broadcasting station shall 
have the nght, but shall not be compelled, to require 
the submission and permanent filing, in such station, 
of a copy of the complete address, script, or other form 
of expression, intended to be broadcast over such sta-
tion before the time of the intended broadcast thereof. 
1963 
45-2-7. Limitations and restrictions — Immune 
from liability — Due care. 
Except as provided in Section 45-2-1 5, nothing in 
this act contained shall be construed to relieve any 
person broadcasting over a radio or television station 
from liability under the law of libel, slander, or defa-
mation. Nor shall anything else in this act be con-
strued to relieve any person, firm, or corporation 
owning or operating a radio or television broadcast-
ing station or network from liability under the law of 
libel, slander, or defamation on account of any broad-
cast prepared or made by any such person, firm, or 
corporation or by any officer or employee thereof in 
the course of his employment In no event, however, 
shall any such person, firm, or corporation be liable 
for any damages for any defamatory statement or act 
published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or 
sound broadcast unless it shall be alleged and proved 
by the complaining party that such person, firm, or 
corporation has failed to exercise due care to prevent 
the publication or utterance of such statement or act 
in such broadcast. Bona fide compliance with any fed-
eral law or the regulation of any federal regulatory 
agency shall be deemed to constitute such due care as 
hereinabove mentioned. 1975 
45-2-8. Liability in case of joint operation. 
In any case where liability shall exist on account of 
any broadcast where two or more broadcasting or 
television stations were connected together simulta-
neously or by transcription, film, metal tape, or other 
approved or adapted use for joint operation, in the 
making of such broadcast, such liability shall be con-
fined and limited solely to the person, firm, or corpo-
ration owning or operating the radio or television sta-
tion which originated such broadcast. 1963 
45-2-9. R e p e a l e d . 1963 
45-2-10. Privileged broadcasts. 
A privileged broadcast which shall not be consid-
ered as libelous, slanderous, or defamatory per se, is 
one made: 
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty. 
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threly that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of nght to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Disputed facts. 
Discovery. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
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DIVISION OF REGISTRATION 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Fourth Floor 
Hrber H. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REGISTRATION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE Of UTAH 
:N THE MATTE? CF THE LICENSES OF 
DAVID W. BROWN 
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO 
PPESCRIBE AND ADMINISTER 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
A M E N D E ; P E T I T I O N 
CASE NO. RC-84-97 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
These caures of action were investigated by the Utah Division of 
Ref i st rat ior. (the Division) upon complaints that BROWN, a licensee of the 
Division, has engaged in acts and practices which constitute violations of the 
Medical Practice and Controlled Substances Acts, Utah Code Ann., Sections 
58-12 And 5S-37. 
Pft ^ ~rif 
1. The Division is a Division of tr.e Department of Business 
r«-ri:l'ii.rns o: the State of Utah* ert«:'\:sred by virtue of Section c8-1 - 1 of 
the ;;t -in ;• ^  -
2. E-CVN is a lictrcve of : *.c Division. 
STATPttMT Or FACTS 
3. a. On or about June 18 to 22 . 19829 December 20 to 24t 
1982, October 22 to November 3t 1982, August 10 to U. 1983, 
August 16 to 19, 1983, November 13 to IS, 1983, in treating 
Shelley Russell at Valley View Medical Center, BROWN ordered or 
administered quantities of controlled substances in excess of 
what is generally medically recognized as adequate to treat the 
conditions or maladies from which Russell suffered. 
b. On or about the times and dates given in paragraph 3a 
above, BROWN failed to order adequate monitoring of Rusriell*s 
condition after administration of controlled substances. 
c. On or about December 20, 1982 to December 24, 1982, 
while treating Shelley Russell at Valley View Medical Center, 
BROWN administered controlled substances intravenously without 
an established intravenous access. 
d. On or about April 12, 1982, August 18, 1982. May 1, 
1983 and August 16, 1983, BROWN performed dilatations and 
curettages on Shelley Russell. That number of procedures in 
that period of time were not medically indicated. 
e. On or about January 16, 1984, BROWN agreed, relative tc 
sanctior. imposed by Valley Vi-j* Kedic*l Center, -O discontinue 
treating Shelley Russell in the hospital or in the community. 
Pursuant to >hat agrec.T.snt, £f>:VN asV.ed Wesley R. Sullivan, K.D. 
and Kotert E. McClellan, M.D.. to assume the medical care of 
Shelley Russell. Thereafter, i ?•:•'»% continued to prescribe and 
A Minister regular dosages of controlled substances to Russell 
without advising Sullivan or McClellan. 
nnnAHfi 
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I. Oi or about January, 19841 to April, 1984, *#*iil# 
knowing that Shelley Russell <as habituated to controlled 
substances, BROWN administered md prescribed quantities of them 
lu hrr which nil) ft I i vf li yr»pp potentially addictive and were 
not collectively medically justifiable given the medical 
conditions and maladies of Russell 
I On or about February 20, 1984 and March 9f 1984, BROWN 
prescribed quantities of controlled substances to himself. 
h. On or about April 4, 1982, June 2, 1982,. June 25, 1983, 
October 27, 1983, December 3, 1983, December 4, 19S3, December 
10, 1983, January 8, 1984% January 1?,» 2 984t Januar y ?0, 1984 
and April 10, 1984, BROWN prescribed quantities of controlled 
substances to his wife, Nora Brown, knowing that to do so 
violated recognized standards of ethics of the medical 
profession. 
i. On or about- April 3, 1984 BPOWN closed an unclean 
puncture wound on the foot of Brad C. Hulet. The closing of 
puncture wounds, and the closing of unclean wounds represents a 
departure from responsible medical practice. Thereafter Hulets* 
wound became infected and 2RCVN failed to provide timely, proper 
radical intervention to prevent deterioration of Huiets' 
condition. 
j. On or about April 18, 1934, B ROWS' failed to have 
available for inspection copies of Federal Order forms for 
•Schedule II controlled substances. 
k. On or about September 3, 198ft r?0WN delivered a 
premature infant (Valley Vicw Medical Center patient <ri03A24-3) 
and thereafter failed to provide or order standard medical care 
for such an infant, to *iy( lie did tot provide for: 
1) Transportation of the infant to a facility with 
proper resources to handle itfs car*; 
?) Administration of measured oxygen; 
3) Appropriate I.V. fluids; 
4) Nourishment for the infant; 
5) Care for Jaundice. 
COUMT I 
4. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 3 above as if fully set out herein. 
5. Section 58-1-25 of the Utah Code provides that the Division may 
revoke a license if the holder is guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
6. Section 58-12-36 defines unprofessional conduct to include: 
(10) Prescribing to one's self controlled substances. 
(11) Adir/mistering or prescribing controlled substances 
to an addict or habitue. 
(15) Any conduct or practice, contrary to the recognized 
standard of ethics of the medical profession, or any conduct 
which dc-?s or ;night constitute a Ci~s*r to the health, 
welfare or safety of the ratient or public. 
(16) Gross incompetence in the practice of rr.edicine. 
7. By in&o£:n& in tfr.e acts and practices contained in paragraph 
number 3 above. &P.CVN has violated the provisions of 58-12-36 (10), (11) ,(15) 
*nd (16), constituting grounds for the revocation of his licenses 'inder the 
provisions of Section 53-1-25 of the Utah Coie. 
000438 
COWT II 
8. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
a l l e g a t i o n s « M f 11™ f hi in |J I r i | 1 i p h 5 I  t h r o u g h ! above as if fully set out 
herein. 
9. Section 58-37-8 (?)(a)(vil of I he Act provides that it is 
unlawful for a physician to prescribe quantities of controlled substances in 
escess of whit Is generally medically recognized as necessary to treat the 
condition or maladies of the ultimate user. 
10. By engaging, in the acts and practices contained in paragraph 
number 3, BROWN is i n v i o 1 a t i o r o f t h e p c • :> v i s i c n s o f 5 8 3 7 8 (2 } (v i)» 
constituting unprofessional conduct and grounds for the revocation of his 
licenses under the provisions of Section 58-1-25 of the Utah Code. 
COUNT III 
11. The Division : ealleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraph 1 through 3 above is if fully set out 
herein. 
12. Section 58-37-6 (5>(a) provides that persons licensed to 
administer controlled substances shall maintain records in conformance with 
record-keeping and inventory requirements of Federal and State law. 
!3. Section 1305.13 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that 
copies of controlled substance order forms shall be maintained for a period of 
two yvdrs. 
1*. By tr&aging in the acts and practices contained in paragraph 
number 3 above, BROWN has violated the provisions of 58-37-6 (5)(a) 
constituting g,rc«urids for the revocation of his licenses under the provision of 
Section '.8-1-25 of the Utah Code. 
WHttCroiE. the Divieio* requests the following relief: 
1. That BROWN be adjudged and decreed to have engaged in the acts 
alleged herein. 
2. That by engaging in the above acts, BROWN be adjudged and 
decreed to have violated the provisions of the Radical Practice Act and the 
Controlled Substance Act. 
3. That an Order be issued revoking the licenses of DAVID V. BROWN 
to practice Medicine and to Administer and Prescribe Controlled Substances. 
DATED this ID day of /fTW X , 1985. 
^T ^fi%AM^ 
DIVISION OF^reCISTRATION 
Utah Department of Business Regulation 
00044C 
;TATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
I )n the . /ff^dai of Af/?/£- . _. 19S5. personally 
appeared before me Steven Davis, the signer of the above instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same on behalf of the Division of the 
Utah Department of Business Regulation. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
nnnA.ii 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472) 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN (#2891) 
Chief, Assistant Attorney General 
NICHOLAS E. HALES (#4045) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Reaulation Division 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5319 
cooOooo 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OP REGISTRATION, STATE OF UTAH 
ocoOooo 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES 
OF DAVID W. BROWN TO PRACTICE 
KEDICINE AND TO PRESCRIBE AND 
ADMINISTER CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN TEE STATE OF UTAH 
STIPULATION & ORDER 
Case No. RG-84-97 
-cccOooo-
The Division of Reqistration of the Department of 
Business P.equlation of the State of Utah (the Division) , by and 
throuqh its attorney, Nicholas E. Hales, Assistant Attorney 
General, and David W. Brown (Brown) a licensee of the Division by 
and throuqh his attorney B. Ray Zoll, hereby stipulate and aqree 
as follows: 
STIPULATION 
1. Brown is duly licensed by the State of Utah to 
practice medicine and to administer and prescribe controlled 
substances in the State of Utah. 
2. A complaint in the matter has been brouqht and 
properly filed pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-12-35.1 et sect. (as amended). 
00044 
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 It1" rU'f c, and pra t i r e s er.jaqpd J ' 1 r i • " i -
c a l * ! 1 ij, L i t ' i i i in in« i i i i in i ' l d i i i c e s I n j wliLt i l i a i i t e n s t f i u p r a c -
t i c e medicine and administer and p r e s c r i be contro l l ed substances 
i s required. 
111
 v -Jiihits t h e i u r i s d i c t i o n nf the D iv i s ion of 
Req i s t ra t ion over him and over the subiec t niritter of thi& at 
and s p e c i f i i l l v in « , i , t i 1 ii.it J formal hearinq be 
scheduled pursuant I J t ,-ih (lode Ann • 0-12-35.1 (1953, as 
amended). 
5 .. . , ..edges ti^r ;* e ^ t r ^ s in4-- t h i s St ipu-
l a t i o n F ~Z ..: • 'ir : I > , ^ J * t i ,? - :*i :^. : e : * : f *^ whatsoever has 
been made r • • ' : • nr 
uresentat ivt *: - ;.. . . / i s i o n induce *-: * . . \4 <> ::.. 
S t i p u l a t i ir 
^ one <-r^  t . *.oed " ~ the 
D i v i s i o n ' s Amended P e t i t . ' •_ - neither ad I t s r^  r Genie?: a:v, 
^rongdoin^ Neither shal 
pos i t i c ; , *.. :*rfl£Lieu . he t t ; \ 
7 aqrees t reimburse the Divis i -•• JP e:-r*?;4 
• *:nesses for * l " 4 • ied:..--* 
impos i t ions conducted
 t •. - *ounsel net. exceed 
$400.00 t o t a l paid bv Brov/n. 
iii •; rf»rop i c a t i r r :~ 
Family Prac t i ce medic; » > -V J ^ : - K 
9. Brown aqrees to abide by the following conditions 
:>f practice for a period of thirty (30) months beyond the stip-
ulated probationary period described herein of 120 days. Fur-
:hermore. Brown aqrees that if durinq the thirty (30) month 
period immediately followinq the probationary period. Brown 
materially violates any of the conditions of practice, said 
violation shall constitute qrounds for the suspension or revoca-
:ion of his medical license as determined at a hearinq to be 
schedule as per the usual rules of procedure. The conditions of 
practice shall be as follows: 
A* Brown shall not provide any medical ser-
vices to, or prescribe or administer 
controlled substances to Shelly Russell. 
B. Brown shall not prescribe or administer 
controlled substances to himself or 
family members except in emerqency 
situations and in no event any lonqer 
than 24 hours. 
C. Brown shall maintain complete records of 
all controlled substances dispensed or 
administered by him as required, by state 
and federal statutes, and applicable 
states and federal rules and requlations 
reqarding controlled substances. 
D. Brown shall make all diliqent efforts to 
obtain a consultation from a board-
certified neonatoloqist for every infant 
delivered by Brov*n under 1500 qrams in 
weiqht and/or 34 weeks in gestational ace 
within the first hour after the birth. 
If, after dilicer.t efforts. Brown is 
unable to obtain a consultation within 
the first hour. Brown shall continue 
usinq all diliqent efforts to obtain a 
consultation until a consultation is 
obtained. 
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Brown shall, ii requested, meet with the 
PLB every six months during the 30 month 
period. The PLB shall provide Brown at 
least one week written notice before the 
requested meeting* 
•-P ". • . ; by 
. „*, , , ,egii> :dtK;: 'D i r ec t c i and the 
P h y s i c i a n s L icens ing B ? a ^ f - t • .- » S t i p u l a t i o n shal * 
a f i r - ! ---~ I P e t i t i o n 
Division M .* matter ^ * * 
Director or the PLB fail to a uiuvt uu.s> .* 
V * s I I,' I I I I ! I L | 1 f L I • 
:he Division and Brown agree that this Stipulation 
shal 1 be made par t of t h e a 11 a eh ed r i i 11 0 i «11: r. 
i 11 i' in v i s i o n and Brown s t i p u l a t e t h a t t he D iv i -
s i o n . Brown and a l l employees,, agen t s and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s '-f tlw 
D i v i s i o n
 a n c j ni-owi i ! i 1 es] in Jin i i j / U|LH" s t i on:: by t h i r d p a r -
t i e s concern ing t h e f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n of thi.i ma t t e r by r e f e r e n c e 
to t h e fo l lowing s t a t emer" -
The D i v i s i o n ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the 
p r a c t i c e of Dr. Brown has been completed. A 
s t i p u l a t i o n r e s o l v i n g t h e D i v i s i o n ' s Amended 
P e t i t i o n has been execu ted . No h e a r i n g w i l l 
be conduc ted . Copies of t h e D i v i s i o n ' s 
Amended P e t i t i o n , and the S t i p u l a t i o n and 
Order i n t h i s mat te r a re l o c a t e d a t t h e 
D i v i s i o n ' s Of f i ce . 
1 3 , 'rii .' D iv i s ion and Brown s t i p u l a t e t h a t Brow: 
l i c e n s e t o p r a c t i c e medic ine s h a l l be suspended 
s i x (61 i!i'""Mi'i' I f u r t h e r 
s t i p u l a t e d t h a t i>- \ dayc rf s a i d suspens ion s h a l l 
be stayed subject to Brown's license beinq placed on probation 
for a period of four (4) months beqinninq January 15 , 19 86 and 
Brown's compliance with the herein delineated terms of probation. 
Furthermore, the Division and Brown stipulate that 
Brown's license to administer and prescribe controlled substances 
shall be suspended for one hundred and twenty (120) days effec-
tive November 15, 1985. Followinq the one hundred and twenty 
(120) day period, Brown1s license to administer and prescribe 
schedule II controlled substances shall be suspended for an 
additional sixty (60) days. 
The terms of the probation of Brown's license to prac-
tice medicine shall be the same as the conditions of practice 
herein delineated in paraqraph 9. 
DATED this A? day of November, 1985. 
7^> 
NICHOLAS E. H / O t t 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
Tax and Business- R e g u l a t i o n 
Div. 
t\. 
DAVID W. BROWN 
*V/TL^ /tlSz-
y 
B. RAY ZOLL 
Attorney for Dav] 
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flftPER 
Based noon Lim f o r e g o i n g * r? " v - r c 
appear inq * l„" r of" M *j 
WHEREFORE, TT IS HEKEBY ORDEPED t h a t e f f ec t \" - " " V H UM 
1 5 f I'Mibr the l i c e n s e fn r t / i . ( • • • i i i ih i mr: M David IV. Brown 
s h a l > • i II, i""! 1 , i , i a per iod of s i x 16) mon ths . 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, t h a t << M -M M> I 
t h e s u s p e n s i o n of H. "» I . , I st u p i a e t i c e medic ine s h a l l ^ 
s t :iyed S U D I C L L t o B r o w n ' s l i c e n s e tc p r a c t i c e m e d i c i n e b e i n q 
p l a c e d on p r o b a t i o n foi ;t i»eti . 'd f • • 'i.oiu. no beq inni ru i 
Januar n >HM I M ^ H ,.* c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e h e r e i n 
d e l i n e a t e d t e r m s or p r o b a t i o n , 
IN ADDITION, TT ' "1UKKLI' «ki* i i i " w n ' s l i c e n s e t o 
n rii 11 I i • f i • n i i. r e c c i i !:>t c u n t r o l l e d s u be tan ce s sh al ] he s us pen de d 
for one h u n d r e d and twentv U?T" davr o f f e r " i... i/< v nu-e J I 'K 
1985 , F o l l r w i 1 ' " • i' UUL, and twentv day pe r iod# Brown ' s 
' > n^e t o a d m i n i s t e r and p r e s c r i b e s c h e d u l e T I cor^ r o l l e d 
s u b s t a n c e s s h a l l be s u s p e n d e d f. . '" i .1 s i x t v Itl") d a y s . 
Th":j I'.'iin.'.- "."I Hit" p r o b a t i o n <-f ^ r c w n ' s l i c e n s e t o p r a c -
t i c e m e d i c i n e s r . a l ] ir <*s f o l l o w s : 
LxOwn saaii no t p r o v i d e any m e d i c a l s e r -
v i c e s t o f or p r e s c r i b e or a d m i n i s t e r 
c o n t r n i i p d subs t ance * r »d * ** R u s s e l l , 
T
 B* ^ r ^ : . ^ 1 not . r e s e t s . ~wi . . in ibier 
c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s t ' h i m s e l f or 
f a m i l y members e x c e p t , r> emerqency 
s i t u a t i o n s and in no eu- • - longer 
t h a n 24 h o u r s . 
Brown shall maintain complete records of 
all controlled substances dispensed or 
administered by him as required, by state 
and federal statutes, and applicable 
states and federal rules and requlations 
reqardinq controlled substances. 
Brown shall make all diliqent efforts to 
obtain a consultation from a board-
certified neonatoloqist for every infant 
delivered by Brown under 1500 qrams in 
weicht and/or 3 4 weeks in qestational aqe 
within the first hour after the birth. 
If, after diliqent efforts. Brown is 
unable to obtain a consultation within 
the first hour, Brown shall continue 
using all diliqent efforts to obtain a 
consultation until a consultation is 
obtained. 
Brown shall, if requested, meet with the 
FLB every six months durino the term of 
probation. The PLB shall provide Brown 
at least one week written notice before 
the requested meetinq. 
DATED this Jt3//f day of November, 1985. 
PHYSICIANS LICENSING BOARD 
> 
ROBERT 0. BOWEN, Director 
Division of Reqistration 
DIVISION OF REGISTRATION 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Fourth Floor 
Heber M. Wells ainidinp, 
Salt Lake City, Utah H<'*-.„ 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REGISTRATION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF 1 JTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF ) 
SHELLEY L. RUSSELL ) 
TO PRACTICE AS A ) 
REGISTERED NURSE ) 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
P H T 1 J I 0 N 
CAS I- IIMU lulu, B'l'i* 8 ! 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
T h e s e c a u s e s o f a c t ! i n w c r o i n v e s t i f,a* i*d by ' h e U t a h D i v i Hi ^f 
R e g i s t r a t i o n ( t ho D i v i s i o n ^ i tpon l o m i i l a i n t s t h . i t R U S i ' r I L i i e n .« •> 
Tii i in i i iifea&t-'ij in in I > and \ fuel i c e s wh i i h i DM .1.1 t u t u v i o l a t i o n s d 
U t a h N u r s e P r a c t i c e A c t . , h t a h Codv Ann , C h a p t e r 5 8 - 3 1 , 
PARTIES 
1 I" he Division is a Division of HIP Depart mer* ' Business 
R e g u l a t i o n s o ! I lie ':"«!,ith1 I HI illi .ill lb 1 in sli » Il II n • ; J t i "IH i I m l 
the Utah Code. 
2, SHELLEY L. RUSSELL is a licensee of the Division. 
jn. jr\ r% «f «t O 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
3- a. On or about February to April, 1984, RUSSELL received 
administrations and prescriptions for controlled substances from several 
physicians without making each aware of the controlled substance she was 
receiving from the others. 
b. On or about March 17, 1984, RUSSELL misrepresented the 
results of past endoscopic tests in an effort to obtain controlled substances. 
c. On or about February to August, 1984, RUSSELL was impaired 
because of drug dependence. 
COUNT I 
4. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 3 above as if fully set out 
herein. 
5. Section 58-31-14(b) of the Utah Code provides that the Division 
may revoke a license if the holder is guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
6. Section IV C-15 of the Rules of Conduct Governing Nurses 
defines unprofessional conduct to include violating state or federal drug laws. 
7. Section 58-37-8(4)(a)(ii) of the Utah Code provides it to be a 
violation to procure or attempt to procure controlled substances by 
misrepresentation, deception or subterfuge. 
8. By engaging in the acts and practices contained in paragraph 
number 3 above, RUSSELL has violated the provisions of IV C-15 of the Rules of 
Conduct Governing Nurses, constituting grounds for the revocation of her 
license under the provisions of Section 58-31-14(b) of the Utah Code. 
noG45( 
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9, The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 8 above as if fully set out 
111 Section 58-31-14 ( M of* the Utah """ode provides thai the Division 
may revoke or suspend a miir1:** '. license it the nut M" I •. mil i "I ii in piiij.tr1 • iil 
I i xli&enee f habits such a s habitual intemperance, or Addiction * "i" 
habit-forming drugs, 
li- 1 paragraph 
number \ RUSSELL . vuii.- 1 • r* j.r.^ . ions '.: 58-31 14(c), 
constituting grounds for the revocation ui u«i.
 x i c e n s e under Mi,1 p'-wisr :  • is :  :!: 
Snr ! 11 in " i H I il II! I! I I Il 
WHEREFORE, t h e D i v i s i o n req 11 PStn 
1 hliSStlL be adjudged and decreed to have engaged in I.he ac t s 
a l l eged h e r e i n . 
2 T l I ! / r . u f , "M I,1". * ' ' ' i1"1 v I| '" RUSSELL be adjudged qnd. 
d e c r e e d t o have v i o l a t e d t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Utah N u r s e P r a c t i c e A c t . 
3 II J1 it an Order bo i ssuei I revoking, I lie I 1 PIISI 1! SHE'I II I ' Y III.. 
111 in I i ee as a Reg i s te red Nurse . 
±i......<**? l0f . ^ Vifc^ _ • ] 984-
DIVISION OF REGISTRATION 
Utah D e p a r t m e n t o f Busine*?" IWVPJII I nil inn 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the Crf- (- day of ^j pT/ii/{'t C , 1984, personally 
appeared before me Steven Davis , the signer 
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same on behalf of the Division of the Utah Department of Business Regulation. 
> ' . . ; . 
^^^MOTARY PUBlIC 
My Commission Expires: 
nnnA52 
i A V I . U. WILKINSON (#3 4 7 2) 
A t t o r n e y General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIHAN (#2891) 
A s s i s t a n t At torney Genera l 
Divis ion Chief 
NEAL T. GOOCH (#1216) 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
Tax and B u s i n e s s R e g u l a t i o n n 
Room 130 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 5 3 3 - 5 3 1 9 
BEFORE THF i "n J t1 i- hG 1 STF'.M TON 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE ) STIPULATION 
OF SHELLEY L. RUSSELL TO ) 
PRACTICE AS A REGISTERED ) ,ust II K, 1.4 U 
NURSE IN THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
The uivision of Registration of the* Department of 
Business Regulation of the State :' !"* -
thr Assist a M Attorney General, 
and Shel. *: Russell ondent licensee * * r:y',0iuuf 
through her attorney, r>. . • ^aree as 
f o'l I , >w u i 
STIPULATION 
1 , Ppcpondent i i i! ! , "! i v. < •! ! , I in StaVi? o t 111 ah t o 
1 i a i L i M 1 i L :i ' i "j i ist e i e e l n u r s e . 
P u r s u a n t t o f o r m a l i on i f l a i nt . f he Di i i n n t t i i i t -
e d a n I n v e s t ] p l i n '. | i •, i h I i h I il. '.* in A n n . *«, M* 1 I . »t 
s e q « i I '»'' ( i / a s amend* *J 
3* Dpon completion of its investigation, the Division 
filed a petition alleging that Respondent had violated Utah Code 
\nn. SS 58-31-14(b), 58-37-8 (4) (a) (ii) , and Section IV C-15 of 
the Rules of Conduct Governing Nurses. 
4. Respondent denies the allegations made by the 
Division in paragraph 3 and denies any wrongdoing or violation of 
law. 
5. Respondent asserts that she enters into this stipu-
lation for the sole purpose of resolving the matter before the 
Division, and by so doing makes no admission as to any violation 
of law or the Rules of Conduct Governing Nurses, or other wrong-
doing either legal or equitable. 
6. Respondent acknowledges that she enters into this 
stipulation voluntarily, and that no threat or promise whatsoever 
has been made by the Division, or any member of the staff of the 
Division or any officer, agent or representative of the Division 
to induce her to enter into this stipulation. 
7. Respondent and the Division agree that, upon ap-
proval by the Director of the Division of Registration, this 
stipulation shall be a final compromise and settlement of all 
counts in the petition filed by the Division in this matter. 
However, the Division reserves the right to discipline the Re-
spondent in the event the terms and conditions of this stipula-
tion are violated or other circumstances come into existence 
which warrant discipline. In the event the Director fails to 
-2- OOG45' 
appi: ... stipulation, it will be of no further force, and 
effect. 
i c I i i i i i v i s i o n i g r e e as follow^ 
i, ['he D iv i s ion sna i l con t inue t he hea r ing 
m a t t e r lor .in i n d e f i n i t e oeinoiL 
1
 I . ,il i p u l a t i o n s h a l l not be admit ted as evidence 
a g a i n s t Dr. David u d ^ n ti) the case the Div is i«' ni" dt-M i-: i ( i r ion 
b r i n g s a g a i n s t r i , " - • » n i.r i. 
Respondent, v o l u n t a r i l y ag ree s t o submit to t he 
random talcing of u r i n e and/or blood uyc^ > • ; J* '.** " "1 \. I i v i s i o n 
fo i a DO r i 'I > i Beginning with \ iw datf i he order ap-
p rov ing the s t i p u l a t i o n i/i t h i s ma t te r i s s igned by t ' i P v i ,p 
The samples a r e not i *>\t emi I ,i , «;|j ;ei; n, nth anu slnnl I be 
i i i.efu,etj t r i i i t l p a r t y , t i be agreed upon by f,he l a i -
t i e s . The t ak inq of u r ine samples sha l l be nii^Pivm ' , in 
ag reed upon M i i I i ui ' i. . 'ilir n-,1 ni p roces s ing the sdnplet-
jf. ha J .1 Li.1 borne Ly t h e Div i s ion , The samples s h a l l be taken 
w i t h i n four houri: <<l l\\v ,« equest 
il, P"eti|.oi"ident u l u l l provide a t e lephone number or 
numbers a t which she can be reached dur ing the hours of e,u i 
o ' c l o c k (8 :0 0» <i m„ and fivt1" n'i in - i -o i » | n ,H d a i l y 
b a s i s ;"'l'n'' sha l l uJ,:. :» kn.j.p htri ma i l i ng add re s s c u r r e n t wi th t h e 
Div i s ion* 
e . Respnndn 1 »- ti '" " ..t ^so it a l low the t ak inq of 
o 'or u r ine samples by the Div i s ion ci the D i v i s i o n ' s 
igent during the one-year period provided in paragraph 8c , except 
Eor emergency reasons or e x i g e n t circumstances. 
f. In the event she re fuses to allow the taking of 
blood and/or urine samples, or the samples prove p o s i t i v e for 
c o n t r o l l e d substances for which Respondent has no l e g a l prescr ip-
t i o n , Respondent a g r e e s t o the suspension of her l i c e n s e t o 
p r a c t i c e as a r e g i s t e r e d nurse for a period of one year . The 
i s s u e of whether or not Respondent has refused to allow the 
tak ing of blood and/or urine samples or whether or not the pos i -
t i v e t e s t r e s u l t for c o n t r o l l e d substances v i o l a t e s the s t i p u l a -
t i o n i s t o be determined by the Nursing Board in open hearing 
a f t e r appropriate n o t i c e . 
g. Respondent s h a l l not be treated by Dr. David Brown 
nor s h a l l Dr. David Brown or h i s partners prescribe contro l l ed 
subs tances for Respondent during the one-year period provided ir 
paragraph 8c , except for emergency or ex igent c ircumstances. 
h. Emergency reasons and ex igent circumstances sha l l 
be de f ined for purposes of paragraphs 8e and 8g as reasons or 
c ircumstances for which no other physician in the community i s 
a v a i l a b l e a t the time the Respondent requires treatment or the 
p r e s c r i p t i o n . Such reasons or circumstances must be of an 
ex traordinary nature and more than a mere request for r e l i e f of 
p a i n . 
9 . The D i v i s i o n s h a l l d ismiss i t s case aga ins t Respon-
dent with prejudice upon the completion of the one-year period of 
- 4 - 0GG45< 
paragraph 8cr provided Respondent's samples of blood and/or urine 
remai n free of controlled substances for which she has no legal 
prescription. 
10. Respondent's license to practice as a registered 
nurse sha 1 ] remain in full force and effect, conditioned only as 
provided herein. 
DATED this j.^. day of ^Jftlefcr, 1985. 
-±%JtycJ^ _ -
SHELLEY (1. RUSSELL 
Respondent 
B. RAY ZOLL (J 
Attorney for Respondent 
ROBERT 0. BCWENf Director 
Division of Registration 
NEAL T. GOOCH# Assistant Attorney 
Generalr Counsel for Division 
of Registration 
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Unacceptable medical practices 
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All Rights Reserved 
CEDAR CITY — Charges of drug abuse 
and unacceptable medical practices have 
fed to the temporary suspension of the li 
cense of Dr. David Brown by the Physi-
cians' Licensing Board, said a state offi-
cial. 
"These are serious charges, and this is a 
serious action," said Robert Bowen, direc-
tor of occupational and professional li-
censing for the state 
Brown has signed a stipulation agreeing 
to a 60-day suspension of his license to 
practice medicine, a 120-day suspension of 
his license to prescribe controlled sub-
stances and an additional 60-day suspen-
sion of his license to prescibe schedule II 
(narcotic) drugs, according to a copy of 
the stipulation obtained from the board 
Unavailable for comment 
No hearing into the charges was held, 
and by signing the stipulation, Brown ag 
reed to the conditions of punishment with-
out admitting guilt, Bowen said. 
Brown was unavailable for comment 
about the charges. A representative of his 
office noted that he is out of town 
An intensive investigation led to the 
charges Brown overprescribed narcotic 
drugs to an operating room nurse who was Jt
 habituated to controlled substances," dig 
medical procedures that were "not medi 
eally indicated" and did "ethical no-no's,"T 
"feowen salcf 
The suspensions of Brown's licenses to 
practice medicine and prescribe drugs 
went into effect Nov. 15, Bowen said, and 
will be followed by a 30-month period dur-
ing whicS he can practi^y if-. 
— Brown shall not provide any medical 
services to, or prescribe or administer 
controlled substances to Shelly Russell, a 
former Valley View Medical registered 
nurse. 
Maintain complete records 
— Brown shall not prescribe or adminis-
ter controlled substances to himself or 
family members except in emergency sit-
uations. 
— Brown shall maintain complete re-
cords of all controlled substances dis-
pensed or administered by him as re-
quired by state and federal law. 
— Brown shall make all diligent efforts 
to obtain within one hour of birth a consul-
tation from a board-certified neonatolog-
ist for every infant delivered by Brown un-
der 1,500 grams and-or 34 weeks in 
gestational size. 
— Brown shall, if requested, meet with 
the Professional Licensing Board every 
six months during the 30 month probation-
ary period. 
(See doctor on p.8) 
W^?^5f-m • ~-r v; $m:" ^g£ 
dardoctor 
KEY: 
CLAIMED TO BE DEFAMATORY 
BY PLAINTIFF 
FROM PUBLIC RECORDS 
FROM ROBERT BOWEN 
Doctor's license curtailed 
(Continued from p.l) 
Brown also agreed in the stipulation 
to sit for board recertification in 
family practice medicine prior to 
Sept. 1, 1966. 
The charges stem from numerous 
incidents of improper behavior be 
tween 1962 and 1984, according to the 
charges on file in Bowen's office, he 
said in a Tuesday telephone inter 
view with The Daily Spectrum: 
Many of the charges relate to 
Brown s treating nurse Russell, in-
cluding allegations that he "ordered 
and administered quantities of con-
trolled substances in excess of what 
is generally medically accepted as 
"adequate." Bowen said, reading 
from the file, made public as part of 
the stipulation signed by Brown. 
"The order (signed by Brown) did 
say his files are an open book," Bo-
wen said in making the petition of 
charges public, noting that any one 
who requests has access to the re-
cords. 
Brown also allegedly failed to ord-
er adequate monitoring of Russell's 
condition, and administered con-
trolled substances to ner intrave 
neously without an established intra" 
venous access Bowen saifr * 
On Jan 16,1984, Brown agreed, un 
der sanctions i 
View Medical Ce 
ied by Valley 
to discontinue 
ell and to turn 
otfier docTors^  
any treatment of 
her care oyer to 
, In violation of that agreement, 
Brown allegedly ' continued to pre-
scribe and administer controlled 
substances'' to R 11 without ad-, 
vising the two nev tors, he saiia\ 
Brown's repeat idmir5 ltion 
of narcotic drugs 1 sseTF ?din 
the record to have .n "he a ted 
to controlled substances." w i ac-
tion called "addictive and J justi-
fiable." he saifi 
In addition, Brown allegedly ad-
ministered "a quantity of controlled 
substames to himself and his wife," 
Lbe charges say 
Brown s treatment of himself and 
his family members is ' 
no-no," and is "not accepts ^tit 
cal practice." Bowen said 
The charges also include a numbei 
oi incidents of "unacceptable med* 
cal behavior," Bowen said. 
Brown is recorded to have per-
formed dialation and curettage pro-
cedures four times from April 1982 to 
August 1983 on Russell, the record 
says. 
"That number of procedures in 
that period oi time wF« >t medical 
ly indicated," tne eria state. ' 
When asked what t procedure 
was, Bowen said, "It's abortion." 
In addition, Brown allegedly failed 
to use "timely, proper intervention" 
in "closing an unclean puncture 
wound" on the foot of Brad Huiet, an 
action deemed improper in the re 
cord, Bowen said. 
And in September 1984, Brown «»: 
legediy "failed to order medi« « 
care" for a premature infant, incite 
ing a failure to transport the infant 
a facility with proper equipment 
its treatment, a failure to correi 
order oxygen, fluids and noun; 
ment for the child and a failure 
care for its jaundiced condition, i 
wen read from the record. 
Though Russell practiced as 
nurse at Valley View Medical Cent 
while under Brown's care, she w.t 
fired there Aug. 28, 1984, said Mai k 
Dal ley, hospital administrator. 
Prior to her termination, Russell s 
license to practice as a registered 
nurse was put on probation in April 
1984 alter the Professional Licensing 
Board found her "impaired because 
of drugs," Bowen saiai " 
Qiarges leading to Russell's pro-
bationary status include a charge 
Chat in early 1984 she received pre-
scribed drugs from several physi-
cians witnout making each doctor' 
aware oi ine others actions. JBowe'n 
said 
The charges also allege that j»he 
misrepresented the results of en-
doscopic lesis to obtain drugsT^k 
said, 
.She was allegedly "impaired be-
cause of drugs from February to 
August 1984. he said. 
The bylaws of Valley View Medical 
Center say any physician censured 
by the licensing board is automati-
cally denied hospital privileges, Dal-
ley said. 
The hospital board will meet soon 
to review the procedures in Browns 
case, he said. 
The Brown Clinic — operated Joint 
ly by doctors David Brown, his broth-
er Scott Brown and Robert Corry — 
will continue operation, with Scott 
Brown and Corry seeing patients. 
Corry said Tuesday. 
"The Brown Clinic's been in bus! 
less for a long time and we'll contin 
tie to stay in operation," he said. 
The investigation into Dr. David 
Brown's misconduct was prompted 
by complaints about his behavior re-
ceived from "someone in southern 
Utah," Bowen said. 
The investigative file dealing with 
Brown's wrongdoings is not a public 
file, and information about the inves-
tigation itself will not be made avail 
able, he said. 
